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ABSTRACT 
 
Svet Derderyan: The Effects of the European Union on Corruption Control in Central and 
Eastern Europe before and after Accession 
(Under the direction of: Milada Vachudova) 
 
This dissertation evaluates the effectiveness of the EU in promoting lasting liberalizing reforms 
in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) before and after accession. It focuses on an area of 
governance with deep implications for both the quality of democracy and the prospect of 
economic development in the region – corruption control. The major finding is that since 
enlargement the EU has not had such strong direct and far-reaching effects as it did before 
accession.  
In analyzing corruption control both as a dependent variable as well as an independent 
one affecting FDI, I make three claims and substantiate each using a mixed-method approach 
featuring both time-series analyses and qualitative methods, such as case studies and expert 
survey data analyses.  
First, civil society development has stagnated since accession and so has its otherwise 
positive influence on corruption control: the exodus of most external donors and the EU’s 
complicated procedures for applying for funding have crippled anti-corruption NGOs’ capacities 
to monitor and advocate reforms.  
Second, EU leverage has been weaker after accession and anti-corruption reform has 
consequently slowed down: supranational pressures from the EU in the form of conditional 
iv 
 
funding and Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania) as 
well as spillover effects from various chapters of the acquis have sufficed to prevent backsliding 
per se, but have not been able to reverse the post-accession trend of a slowdown in reform.  
Third, looking at corruption control as an independent variable, the effects of its 
stagnating trend post-accession include a decline in FDI. Encouraged by positive signaling from 
the EU confirming CEE countries’ progression towards membership, FDI was steadily 
increasing during the pre-accession period and corruption control, improving or stagnant, was 
irrelevant for investors at that time.  However, rates of investment have surprisingly dropped 
soon after accession, as investors have become less driven by cognitive shortcuts (the availability 
heuristic) causing them to assign disproportionate weight to information that is vivid or striking, 
such as the positive signals by the EU. In this new environment their concern about lack of 
progress in corruption control has led them to be more cautious.  
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Chapter I: The limits of the EU’s “transformative power” 
The European Union’s (EU) eastern enlargement that took place between 2004 and 2007 
incorporated ten post-communist countries into the Union, expanded its population by more than 
a 100 million citizens, and turned it into the world’s largest commercial and financial market, 
with a GDP of more than $13 trillion. The significance of this historic event, however, extends 
far beyond geography, demography and economics and has deep symbolic implications. As the 
EU Commission President at the time Romano Prodi put it, “Five decades after our great project 
of European integration began, we are celebrating the fact that Europeans are no longer kept 
apart by artificial ideological barriers.“ This was a moment when after more than a decade of 
difficult and painful transitions, ten post-communist Central and Eastern European (CEE) 
countries finally broke free from their communist legacies and joined the ranks of the developed 
world. The implementation of the EU’s membership conditionality meant that authoritarianism 
and central planning were now buried in the past. Democracy and the free market were “the only 
game in town.”  
But 25 years after the end of communism and ten years after these countries’ accession to 
the EU, challenges to democratic consolidation, such as populism and nationalism, concentration 
of power, corruption and state capture, and others, raise questions about the limits of the EU’s 
“transformative power.” Thus, this dissertation takes on the task to evaluate the effectiveness of 
the EU in promoting lasting liberalizing reforms in CEE before and after accession. It focuses on 
an area of governance with deep implications for both the quality of democracy and the prospect 
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of economic development in the region – corruption control. To what extent have the EU 
accession process and subsequently membership enabled CEE states to catch up with the older 
and more established democracies and more developed economies of Western Europe? To 
answer this question I look at the interplay between supranational (EU) and domestic pressures 
(civil society) for corruption control as well as the consequences of corruption control or lack 
thereof for Foreign Direct Investment (FDI), one of the key sources of economic growth, in the 
region. 
The major finding is that since enlargement the EU has not had such strong direct and 
far-reaching effects on corruption control as it did before accession. This finding falls in line 
with the arguments of several scholars who demonstrate that the EU’s effect on democratic 
development (unlike economic development) after accession has been modest at best (Epstein 
and Jacoby, 2014). They show that corporate state capture and political competition (Innes, 
2014), democratic backsliding (Sedelmeier, 2014), extreme current account deficits (Jacoby, 
2014) and consumption growth that is faster than productivity gains (Epstein, 2014) limit CEE’s 
prospects for catchup with west European countries.  
My work contributes to this literature by suggesting that progress in corruption control 
has been stymied in CEE as a result of EU membership. In analyzing corruption control both as a 
dependent variable whose trends have to be explained as well as an independent one which 
affects other important aspects of post-communist development, such as FDI, I make three 
claims. 
First, civil society development has stagnated since accession and so has its influence on 
corruption control: the exodus of most external donors and the EU’s complicated procedures for 
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applying for funding have crippled anti-corruption NGOs’ capacities to monitor and advocate 
reforms.  
Second, EU leverage has been weaker after accession and anti-corruption reform has 
consequently slowed down: supranational pressures from the EU in the form of conditional 
funding and Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) (in the cases of Bulgaria and 
Romania) as well as spillover effects from various chapters of the acquis have sufficed to prevent 
backsliding per se, but have not been able to reverse the post-accession trend of a slowdown in 
reform.  
Third, looking at corruption control as an independent variable, the effects of its 
stagnating trend post-accession include a decline in FDI: although FDI was steadily increasing 
during the pre-accession period (and corruption control was irrelevant for investors at that time), 
rates of investment have surprisingly returned to pre-enlargement levels soon after accession, as 
investors have become more concerned about lack of progress in corruption control.  
 
Overview and Contributions 
While the liberal economic literature sees strong prospects for CEE’s convergence with 
the west by virtue of EU membership (European Commission, 2010; World Bank, 2012), certain 
historical and sociological analyses anticipate a continuing east–west divide (Janos, 1989, 2000). 
Indeed, there are a number of areas where EU influence has been substantial and lasting - trade 
policy (Kaminski, 1999), single market rules (Mayhew, 1998), agriculture (Fernández, 2002), 
structural funds (Jacoby, 2004), competition policy (Drahokoupil, 2009), enterprise/industrial 
policy (Ellison, 2006), implementation of EU law (Sedelmeier, 2008), bank privatization 
4 
 
(Epstein 2008), pension reform (Orenstein, 2008), enhancing liquidity after the financial crisis 
(Jacoby, 2014) etc.  
 At the same time, the EU’s influence has been weaker and declining after accession with 
regards to taxation (Appel, 2011), budgetary controls (Hallerberg and Yläoutinen, 2010), the 
application of minority rights rules (Sasse, 2008), political party platforms (Vachudova, 2008; 
Haughton,2014), political competition and corporate state capture (Innes, 2014), democratic 
backsliding (Sedelmeier, 2014), anti-corruption reform (Pop-Eleches and Levitz, 2010), and civil 
society (Mungiu-Pippidi, 2010).  
What these studies point at is that on balance the EU has had stronger economic effects 
than political, and that its new post-communist members have had significant problems with 
various aspects of democratic consolidation (Epstein and Jacoby, 2014). Corruption control is no 
exception. 
Given the established importance of domestic factors in effecting policy change 
(Vachudova 2005, Börzel and Risse, 2003; Jacoby, 2004; Haughton, 2012; Dimitrova and 
Buzogány, 2014), the first article of the dissertation explores the role of civil society 
organizations (CSOs) in inducing anti-corruption reforms. The main question it raises is how the 
EU has impacted CSOs' capacity to fight corruption.  Utilizing a mixed-methods approach, the 
article shows that first the EU pre-accession process amplified the impact of CSOs but then, 
paradoxically, EU membership undermined their significance.  
Looking at the ten post-communist states that joined the EU in 2004-07 I first employ 
time-series analysis to establish the positive influence of CSOs on corruption control before 
accession as well as the lack thereof post-accession. I then focus on the qualitative case study of 
Bulgaria and, drawing parallels to the other nine Eastern European EU members, apply historical 
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process tracing and expert survey data analysis to test how exactly the EU affected the capacity 
of CSOs to shape domestic incentives before and after accession.  
My contributions to the existent literature on civil society and corruption fall in several 
areas. First, I offer an alternative theoretical argument to the debate whether the EU accession 
process helped or hurt CSOs in CEE. I show that the EU had a nuanced effect first strengthening, 
but then inadvertently undermining the impact of these organizations. Second, I identify and 
trace the two causal logics behind this dynamic.  Before accession, CSOs took advantage of 
empowerment opportunities, such as more funding and the EU’s encouragement of collaboration 
with governments. In making this argument I also unpack the tools that this empowerment 
provided – advocacy and monitoring – and demonstrate how CSOs employed these tools to 
effect specific anti-corruption reforms. After membership, the withdrawal of most external 
donors from the area and the EU’s insistence that CSOs apply for EU funding through the 
various ministries of their own state led to specific problems with the financing of projects and 
the retention of staff which translated into weakening capacities.   
 But is the declining influence of civil society post-accession justification to expect 
backsliding in corruption control in this time period? To shed more light on this question, my 
second dissertation article takes a broader perspective
1
.  Taking into account various aspects of 
the EU pre–accession process and post-accession pressures this article asks whether corruption 
levels were curbed during the pre-accession period and more importantly whether any such gains 
were sustained after that. Utilizing a mixed-methods approach I show that supranational 
pressures from the EU were strong both pre- and post-membership and the ten post-communist 
                                                          
1
 A version of this article was published in an edited volume, EU Enlargement: Current Challenges and 
Strategic Choices, in August 2013. 
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countries performed well in both time periods, although there is definitely evidence of a 
slowdown in reform after accession.  
There are several contributions to the literatures on EU leverage and post-accession 
compliance that I make. First, employing time series analysis and accounting for an array of 
alternative explanations I refute the skepticism about these countries’ success in trying to curb 
corruption before membership as well as the expectation for backsliding afterwards. Second, I 
unpack the causal mechanisms behind this result.  Using historical process tracing I show that 
corruption received a lot of visibility during the accession period through the Commission 
Regular Reports in which the EU demanded reforms that served to decrease corruption levels 
during the pre-accession period. After accession, gains in the fight against corruption were not 
negated, albeit progress in reform slowed down, as the relative loss of leverage in this time 
period was compensated by the combined effect of three causal mechanisms. First, there were 
positive pressures coming from continued EU leverage - conditional Structural and Cohesion 
Funds and CVM reports (in the cases of Bulgaria and Romania). Second, there is evidence of 
increased linkage - socialization effects leading to higher demands for accountability of public 
officials. Third, there are substantial spillover effects from implementing the acquis in other 
areas – the reduction of the role of the state in the economy, increasing bureaucratic capacity and 
improvements in the legal system.  
My third article takes a slightly different perspective on the corruption control dynamic 
before and after accession. Instead of regarding corruption as a dependent variable as the other 
two articles, it incorporates corruption into the analysis as an independent one. It then focuses on 
one of the most important sources of economic growth in the region since 1989, FDI, and asks 
how corruption has influenced FDI inflows in the region before and after accession. More 
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specifically, the article raises the question of whether positive signaling during the EU pre-
accession process trumped other important factors for FDI, such as corruption, only for them to 
resurface after membership and have the expected impact on investor confidence. Put more 
simply, the article evaluates the differential effect of corruption on FDI inflows in Central and 
Eastern Europe during the different stages of the EU accession progress.  
I hypothesize that explicit signaling by the EU during the negotiations phase increases 
investor confidence and causes investors to discount the importance of otherwise relevant 
factors, such as corruption. The situation changes after accession as the EU no longer sends such 
signals to investors. Thus, once a country is part of the bloc, technical factors reemerge as 
important and investors punish countries that are perceived as lagging behind or backsliding in 
the area of corruption.  
The article features a mixed method approach. First, I use time-series analysis covering 
data from 1996 to 2011 to establish that corruption did not have a significant impact on FDI 
before accession but did afterwards. Then, I present the results of expert survey data and a brief 
case study to demonstrate the specific psychological mechanisms that allowed signaling to cause 
investors to be less risk avert prior to EU membership. 
There are two main contributions that this article makes to the literatures on FDI, 
corruption, and institutional signaling. First, I show that corruption matters for FDI differently in 
different contexts. When countries are perceived as developing as opposed to developed, which 
was the case with the ten post-communist candidates as they were applying for EU membership, 
corruption may not be a significant factor and other considerations (such as positive signaling 
from international institutions) may take prevalence.  Alternatively, when they are considered 
developed and are part of an established international organization like the EU, rational 
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guidebook principles dominate economic actors’ decision-making, corruption matters, and its 
effect on FDI is negative.  Second, I suggest that cognitive shortcuts, such as the availability 
heuristic, help explain behavior when investors operate in information-scarce environments as 
they tend to assign disproportionate weight to signals perceived as legitimate. 
 
Conclusion 
So what do these findings suggest about the EU’s longer-term effects, and particularly the 
CEE prospects for catching-up and overcoming the east-west divide? There are three conclusions 
and lessons that this dissertation draws.  
First, it is clear that EU pressures work best when they take place in conjunction with 
domestic factors (Dimitrova and Buzogány, 2014). The fact that the EU provided opportunities, 
including funding, for civil society organizations to be a part of the accession process and alert 
the Commission of problems and inefficiencies enabled civil society to exert meaningful 
influence on corruption control. Since accession, complicated EU procedures for accession 
funding have led to a stagnation of the sector as many civil society actors have found it hard to 
finance anti-corruption activities. The lesson to be drawn here is the following: the key to revival 
of the sector is for the EU to remove the funds application process from the grip of domestic 
governments, which do not want anti-corruption funded and would methodically create barriers 
preventing CSOs from getting funded and exposing them. Given the close correlation between 
corruption control and strength of civil society it seems that this would be the sensible way to 
restore some of these countries’ more hopeful pre-accession anti-corruption track record. 
Second, the levelling off of corruption control trends post-accession is a mixed bag. On 
one hand it is encouraging that gains in corruption control realized during the accession process 
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were not negated by the granting of membership (Pop-Eleches and Levitz, 2010). Continued EU 
leverage in the form of conditional funding and CVMs combined with increased linkage with 
western Europe and spillover effects of other chapters of the acquis have prevented backsliding. 
On the other hand, however, these countries still remain much more corrupt than the western 
European members (except for Greece and Italy). The lessons here is the following: the EU can 
exert much more pressure on countries during the accession period as its leverage post-accession 
naturally decreases. The implications of this lesson can be nicely traced in the context of the 
Croatian accession in2013. Croatia’s negotiations were much slower, especially in their final 
phase as the Commission required the country to jump through many more hurdles than Bulgaria 
and Romania, particularly on corruption and judicial reform. It is too early to say whether this 
approach has led to a markedly different post-accession trajectory in anti-corruption in Croatia, 
but the idea of the Commission updating its strategies based on learning is encouraging.  
Finally, CEE was able to attract massive FDI in the pre-accession period but the rates of 
post-accession FDI have slowed down within a few years after the initial “bump” that accession 
generated. CEE was an attractive destination for FDI because of the communist legacies of 
industrialization (Bohle and Greskovits, 2012), because of the EU’s policies aimed at promoting 
FDI (Medve-Bálint, 2014), and importantly because of the promise of eventual membership 
(signaling) which the accession negotiations implied. Once membership was granted investors 
could no longer hope for further reforms of the same scale and rate, so they become much more 
focused on the macroeconomic reality that was as opposed to the one that would be if further 
liberalization would follow. Thus, post-accession, investors became less interested in moving in, 
both because many opportunities have already been captured but also because the fundamentals 
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on the ground, including slowdown in corruption reform, made it difficult to justify high rates of 
investment. 
The lessons here are mainly for the investors. Decision makers can be affected by bold, 
striking, and vivid information, such as the EU’s positive endorsement of a country’s accession 
path. Rather than constructing careful cost-benefit analyses they may draw conclusions based on 
limited data and over-extrapolate, especially if others are doing the same (herding behavior). 
Thus, one could say that bounded rationality and inferential shortcuts can be partially responsible 
for overinvestment in CEE in the pre-accession period, and the drop in FDI shortly after 
accession merely signifies the return of comprehensive rational approaches.  
So what do my three articles suggest about CEE’s opportunity to overcome the east-west 
divide? Progress in corruption control after accession has been stagnant or slow at best, the 
impact of civil society on reform has declined, and issues with corruption are partially 
responsible for the slowdown in FDI in the region. Thus, one could speculate that the divide is 
likely to persist, at least in these areas and at least for a while. That said, one could also see 
glimmers of hope in that the Commission is updating some of its approaches to corruption 
control by emphasizing the issue more in the pre-accession stage, in that civil society exerts 
meaningful influence when having access to funding, and in that rates of FDI, despite having 
declined after accession, continue to be high comparatively speaking.  
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Chapter II: Incapacitated? The adverse effects of EU accession on anti-corruption CSOs’ 
capacities to affect corruption control in Central and Eastern Europe 
 
A lot of the literature on the EU’s 5th enlargement has focused primarily on leverage, 
compliance, and the possibility of backsliding (Grabbe, 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 
eds. 2005; Pop-Eleches & Levitz, 2010a; 2010b; Vachudova, 2009). Most of these works look at 
the direct EU efforts to affect governance but also underline that EU leverage works only in 
conjunction with domestic pressure, either through cooperation of governments or through 
opposition parties pressing political leaders to deliver certain results (Vachudova, 2005). Given 
the established importance of domestic factors, it is then justified to also explore the role of civil 
society organizations (CSOs) in affecting policy outcomes (Morrof and Pfister, 2010). In this 
article I evaluate the impact of civil society, and particularly non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs), on one of the most problematic areas of governance in the post-communist world - 
corruption.  
The main question I raise is how the EU pre-accession process and post-accession 
institutional changes have impacted CSOs' capacities
2
 to fight corruption. Drawing on the 
literature on Europeanization and civil society I argue that during the EU pre-accession process 
the impact of CSOs on corruption was amplified through conditional and direct funding as well 
as the EU’s insistence that civil society actors participate in the implementation of various 
reforms associated with the acquis. I also argue that paradoxically EU membership then 
                                                          
2
 I define capacities as the ability to access financial resources that can be used to fund successful anti-corruption 
projects.  
14 
 
undermined the influence of CSOs as the complicated bureaucratic procedures associated with 
applying for EU funds combined with the exodus of other institutional actors that provided 
financial support before accession led to a funding crisis that incapacitated many anti-corruption 
CSOs. 
The article features a mixed-method approach. Looking at the 10 post-communist states 
that joined the EU in 2004-07 I employ time-series analysis to establish the positive influence of 
CSOs on corruption control before accession as well as the lack thereof post-accession. I then 
focus on the qualitative case study of Bulgaria and, drawing parallels to the other nine Eastern 
European EU members, apply historical process tracing and expert survey data analysis to test 
how exactly the EU affected the capacity of CSOs to shape domestic incentives before and after 
accession.  
In terms of contributions to the existent literature on civil society and corruption I offer 
an alternative theoretical argument to the debate whether the EU accession process helped or hurt 
CSOs in Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). I show that the EU had a nuanced effect first 
strengthening, but then inadvertently undermining the impact of these organizations. I identify 
two causal logics behind this dynamic.  Before accession, CSOs took advantage of 
empowerment opportunities, such as more funding and the EU’s encouragement of collaboration 
with governments. In making this argument I unpack the tools that this empowerment provided – 
advocacy and monitoring – and demonstrate how CSOs employed these tools to effect specific 
anti-corruption reforms. After membership, the withdrawal of most external donors from the area 
and the EU’s insistence that CSOs apply for EU funding through the various ministries of their 
own state led to specific problems with the financing of projects and the retention of staff which 
translated into weakening capacities.   
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The rest of the paper is organized as follows. First, I review the literature on the ways in 
which civil society improves governance and on its state in CEE. Then, I trace the historical 
involvement of the EU in seeking to empower the sector. In this section I outline the ways in 
which it strengthened CSOs before accession but I also show how granting membership led to a 
series of changes in the institutional terrain that translated into weakening the sector. Based on 
this background I then generate my hypotheses and test them using time-series analysis, expert 
survey analysis, and historical process tracing. I conclude by outlining the implications of my 
findings for the prospects of civil society and corruption control in CEE.  
 
Civil Society and Corruption 
As much academic literature has demonstrated, building civil society has been a central 
priority in the post-communist democratization agenda. According to liberal democratic theory, 
while the state should provide a government that is subject to free and fair elections, a strong and 
plural civil society guards against excesses of the state and legitimates its authority when based 
on the rule of law (Diamond, 1994). Such guarding against excesses and legitimating of authority 
take place by checking the government’s accountability, a dynamic directly related to effective 
corruption control (Klitgaard, 2000): 
𝐶𝑜𝑟𝑟𝑢𝑝𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 = 𝑚 (𝑀𝑜𝑛𝑜𝑝𝑜𝑙𝑦 𝑜𝑓 𝑝𝑜𝑤𝑒𝑟) + 𝑑 (𝐷𝑖𝑠𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛 𝑏𝑦 𝑜𝑓𝑓𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑎𝑙𝑠)
− 𝑎(𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑜𝑢𝑛𝑡𝑎𝑏𝑖𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦) 
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A vibrant civil society contributes to increasing accountability and thus decreasing 
corruption in two distinct ways. First, through monitoring CSOs can diagnose problems, assess 
actual situations, and point out publically or specifically to shortcomings in government policies. 
Second, through policy advocacy CSOs can clarify the specific changes needed, identify the 
possible coalitions necessary for the outcomes to be achieved, and build popular support for an 
issue (NGO Corruption Fighters’ Resource Book).3 For these reasons scholars overwhelmingly 
agree on the importance of civic organizations for achieving better democratic outcomes and 
greater government accountability (Carothers, 2006; Linz and Stepan, 1996; Schedler, Diamond 
and Plattner, 1999).  In fact, focusing on CEE specifically, some empirical analyses (Karklins, 
2005; Holmes, 2006) have shown that the media and civil society have been the most effective 
promoters of anti-corrupt politics in the region.  
At the same time, the effectiveness of CSOs as a major corruption fighter has also been 
criticized. Compared to Western Europe and the United States, civil society in CEE has not been 
as active and influential (Howard, 2003; Toepler and Salomon, 2003). Similarly, NGOs in the 
region are often viewed with distrust by the government and by the public (Grodeland, 2006). 
Furthermore, given that in the nascent democracies of CEE CSOs are almost exclusively 
externally funded, they have felt little need to engage in constructive dialogue with the wider 
community in which they operate (Fagan, 2005) and often operate with little prospects of long 
term financial sustainability (Carothers and Ottaway, 2000). It is exactly this dynamic that has 
made them so vulnerable to the eventual exit of these external donors. Therefore, while there are 
many ways in which a strong civil society can lead to better democratic outcomes and less 
corruption, it is questionable whether CSOs in CEE have the capacities to do this in a sustained 
                                                          
3
 http://www.ndi.org/files/NGO-Corruption-Fighters-Resource-Book-ENG.pdf (accessed on December 21, 2013). 
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manner. To what extent have these organizations been empowered by the EU pre-accession 
process and how resilient are their capacities to continue to effect change in the post-accession 
period?  What specific mechanisms and technical tools do they use to build up pressure for 
reform?  It is these questions that the rest of this article addresses.  
 
Theoretical Framework 
The theoretical section of this study is organized as follows. First, I present the ways in 
which the EU pre-accession process sought to empower CSOs as well as the arguments as to 
why these measures may not have had much impact. Then, I outline the institutional changes in 
the post-accession period that might have undermined the capacities of many CSOs to exert 
influence.  
 
The EU pre-accession process and the anti-corruption struggle: Conditions enabling and 
undermining the empowerment of CSOs in the pre-accession period 
Corruption became an important topic on the agenda of both academics and policy 
makers as soon as the CEECs started their transitions in 1989 – well before the EU entered the 
field in 1997. Initially, organizations, such as USAID and the World Bank soon followed by 
others
4
, took the lead in encouraging awareness raising and capacity building (Michael and 
Bowser, 2010). When the EU entered the stage in the late 1990s it sought to empower civil 
                                                          
4
 The OECD, UNDP and a range of bilaterals – the German Association of Technical Assistance (GTZ), the UK 
Department for International Development (DfID), the Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(NORAD), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA), and the Soros Foundation 
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society further granting these organizations participatory rights, encouraging cooperation 
between them and the government, and providing them with funding and knowledge transfer 
opportunities. This was a broad platform but it also focused specifically on anti-corruption CSOs 
since corruption was considered one of the main challenges of the post-communist transition, as 
featured in the EU Regular Reports on Hungary in 1999 and 2000, Latvia 1999, Poland 2002, 
Bulgaria 2001, and Romania 2001 among many others (Derderyan, 2013).  
In order to assist CEEC with the adoption of the acquis and the Copenhagen criteria, the 
EU offered CSOs encouragement in four broad areas specified in the civil society literature. At 
the same time the pre-accession process also sustained certain conditions that were not 
conducive to the emergence of a strong civil society.  
So how did the EU pre-accession process empower civil society in CEE? First, CSOs 
were granted participatory right and had the opportunity to alert the Commission of 
implementation problems during the pre-accession period by monitoring activities of the state. In 
this way the EU was aiming to increase both the effectiveness, by tapping into the knowledge 
base of non-state actors, and the democratic legitimacy of the process (Finke, 2007).  
Secondly, the EU provided funding (Boerzel and Buzogany, 2010) for projects which 
was explicitly made subject to the partnership principle that the Commission had initially 
introduced in the 1980s to deepen the relationship between national governments and their 
regions (Hooghe ed., 1996). The Commission made this funding conditional on the cooperation 
of national and subnational governments with different business and non-governmental 
organizations (Bruszt, 2008; Gasior-Niemiec, 2010; Grosse, 2010). Similarly, joint commissions 
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were set up for the monitoring of the SAPARD and PHARE programs which enabled some 
CSOs to considerably strengthen their capacities (Bruszt, 2008).  
Third, the EU also allocated direct payments for CSOs in order to strengthen their 
capacities (Kutter and Trappman, 2010; Andonova, 2004; Iankova, 2009). The objective was to 
enable these organizations to participate in the political arena and to strengthen their own 
democratic and organizational structure. CSOs could apply for short term project grants to 
perform services related to the implementation of EU law.
5
 Such grants could be used for both 
monitoring and policy advocacy activities.  
Finally, the EU Commission tried to also increase CSOs’ levels of expertise by 
encouraging collaboration with like-minded organizations on the EU level. CSOs from CEEC 
were assisted in building relationships with transnational networks and European umbrella 
organizations (Euro-groups) to learn more about implementation of EU law (Pleines, 2010, 
Koutalakis, 2010). Thus, CSOs were given the opportunity to both raise their domestic profile 
and also gain greater international recognition (Kuttern and Trappman, 2010). 
Some scholars, however, doubt the impact and durability of these capacity-building 
measures. They point at potential vulnerabilities created or sustained by EU involvement in the 
pre-accession period.  
First of all, while supporting civil society, the eastern enlargement, in conjunction with 
the legacies of the communist system, also entailed countervailing forces that served to empower 
the state. The pressure to meet the deadlines set by Brussels encouraged a top-down approach to 
the implementation of the acquis, often decreasing the opportunities for CSOs involvement 
                                                          
5
 More on these grant opportunities: http://ec.europa.eu/transparency/civil_society/general_overview_en.htm#9 
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(Raik, 2006). In fact, this dynamic may have strengthened the positions of the state in this 
relationship by strengthening the core executives (Zubek, 2008).  
Second, the extreme reliance on external funding and donors impeded the development of 
strong internal capacities of CSOs. It made them responsive to these donors’ agendas rather than 
their own priorities and detached them from any nascent grass-root constituencies that were in 
the process of formation (Kutter and Trappmann, 2010). Facing funding problems, CSOs found 
it difficult to retain qualified personnel as experienced activists often left for jobs in the private 
sector. This further weakened their capacities by introducing organizational instability.  
Third, a political culture unconducive to openness and collaboration with non-state actors 
persisted (Kohler-Koch, 2000). Thus, even as the EU encouraged and required cooperation 
between the state and CSOs in the pre-accession period, this cultural antagonism often translated 
into limited collaboration (Fagan, 2004).  
In conclusion, despite the empowerment opportunities provided by the EU pre-accession 
(funding, networks, and rights), CSOs also faced conditions that raised questions about their long 
term ability to take full advantage of these opportunities. Perhaps most importantly, their failure 
to build sustainable capacities limited their potential to be influential after accession, when many 
of their external donors withdrew and funding through the EU was made conditional to approval 
by and cooperation with the state bureaucracy.  
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Accession and the anti-corruption struggle: Conditions undermining the empowerment of the 
CSO sector  
While there are questions about whether the pre-accession process truly empowered civil 
society in CEE or not, little research has been done on what happened afterwards or whether the 
effects of pre-accession empowerment persisted, especially in the area of corruption. In order to 
contextualize the conditions conducive to declining capacity of anti-corruption CSOs in post-
accession period, it is useful to briefly outline the change in the institutional scenario after EU 
membership. While I discuss this in the context of data on Bulgaria, the dynamic described 
below was identical for all countries that joined in 2004-07 and varied slightly only based on 
how fast a country was approaching membership.  
First, before 2007 (the year when Bulgaria joined), external donors were abundant. 
Collectively they accounted for more than 80% of all funding for NGOs (NIT Bulgaria 2006). 
USAID, the German Association of Technical Assistance (GTZ), the UK Department for 
International Development (DfID), the Norwegian Agency for Development and Cooperation 
(NORAD), the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency (SIDA), the Canadian 
International Development Agency (CIDA), and the Soros Foundation all sponsored NGOs in 
various good governance initiatives. As EU accession was knocking on the door, all these 
agencies were withdrawing and relocating their capital and expertise to the Western Balkans 
(mainly Croatia, Macedonia and Serbia).  
USAID, for example, began working in Bulgaria in 1990. Over the next 17 years, 
Bulgaria received more than $600 million in development assistance. USAID’s funding, 
however, was always following a diminishing trajectory, from the Early Transition Years (1990-
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1996):  $206 million, to the Years of Political Stability and Rapid Reform (1997-2001):  $192 
million, to the Years of Consolidation, Stability and EU Accession (2002-2007):  $166 million.
6
 
The funding cycles of the other major international donors followed the same logic.  
The other major change in the institutional context was the manner in which CSOs could 
apply for EU, now the dominant source of sponsorship. There were two avenues. The first one 
was following the application procedures familiar from the pre-accession days. According to 
these, one could apply for grants directly with the European Commission but only if they are in a 
consortium with CSOs from at least another five countries and if they could independently 
finance at least 20% of the project cost. In other words, big NGOs with international network of 
contacts and some funding available at hand were favored.  
Second, after acceding to the Union, every country became part of the common cohesion 
policy and is eligible for financial assistance through the European Regional Development 
(ERDF) and Social Funds (ESF), managed within the framework of seven operational programs. 
One of these programs is the Operational Program Administrative Capacity (OPAC) and one of 
its main purposes is to provide for trained and active civil society structures. It is financed by the 
ESF and implementation of the partnership principle, the enhanced interaction between the civil 
society sector and the public authorities, is believed to be of central strategic importance 
(Todorakov, 2010). The presumption is that this interaction could bring greater effectiveness, 
transparency and accountability in the policy-making process. Thus, starting in 2007, CSOs 
could apply for these funds only through the various ministries of the state, which in turn made 
them vulnerable to the incompetency or corruption of the state’s administration (Index of 
Bulgarian Civil Society 2008-2010, Open Society).  
                                                          
6
 http://transition.usaid.gov/locations/europe_eurasia/countries/bg/bulgaria.pdf (accessed on January 11, 2013). 
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Collectively, these two changes in the institutional context might have substantially 
diminished the capacity of most CSOs (except for the very big ones) to exert influence.  
 
Hypotheses: Increasing Capacity Before Accession, Declining Capacity After 
This historical overview about the opportunities and limitations that CSOs faced in the 
pre- and post- accession periods informs my expectations. In the pre-accession period, the issue 
of corruption was characterized by a high level of visibility through the Commission Regular 
Reports (Derderyan, 2013). Because of this reason the state had significant incentives to 
cooperate and respond to pressures from the EU since it did not want to be delayed or excluded 
from the process (Vachudova, 2005). At the same time CSOs had access to funding opportunities 
from various sources, which allowed them to temporarily possess greater action capacities and 
organizational stability. In other words, in terms of financial resources, CSOs were in a good 
position to employ skilled personnel and fund projects related to corruption control. Because of 
these two reasons, greater willingness of the state to cooperate and especially greater financial 
capacity, I hypothesize that CSOs were able to exert pressure for reform in this time period 
(through being more engaged in the policy proposal (advocacy), implementation, and evaluation 
(monitoring) stages of anti-corruption initiatives).  
However, as accession came closer, the EU started to increase its funding, but the other 
external donors withdrew. There are two major problems that make the absorption of EU funds 
difficult. The first is that the state plays a “gatekeeping” role of EU funds for NGOs and has 
discretion over the bureaucratic procedures that CSOs have to go through to become eligible 
(Index of Bulgarian Civil Society 2008-2010, Open Society). In other words, it is the 
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government that can to a large extent determine how easy or how difficult it would be for an 
NGO to receive funding from the EU. This naturally introduces a bias that can diminish the 
chances of (watchdog) CSOs trying to get funding for a project that would expose the corrupt or 
incompetent nature of the current government. This process is generalizable to all EU member 
states. Second, in order to compete for funding on the EU level without the state's assistance, 
CSOs need to have resilient internal bureaucratic organizations, provide high matching funds 
(between 20 and 80 percent), and be a part of strong international networks, something that only 
the larger and more established organizations are (Index of Bulgarian Civil Society 2008-2010, 
Open Society). Thus, given the key role the state plays in securing EU funding for most CSOs 
post-accession, I expect that anti-corruption CSOs (looking to expose and criticize the 
government) would have a difficult time accessing funds and would hence experience decreasing 
capacities.  
 My argument, therefore, is three fold: 1) Anti-corruption CSOs exerted a significant 
influence before accession but there was a sharp decline in their effectiveness after accession; 2) 
Reduced variation in funding sources has been decisive in this as external donors moved out; 3) 
Also key are the EU high bureaucratic capacities for direct individual applications and/or greater 
governmental mediation in selecting projects and funding for CSOs.  
 
Methodological Framework 
I employ three methods to evaluate my argument. First, I run a time-series analysis on 
data on the ten post-communist countries that joined the EU in 2004-07 to establish that civil 
society had a positive and statistically significant effect on corruption control before accession 
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and that this effect was not sustained after accession. Second, I supplement the findings from the 
statistical analysis by evaluating the results of an expert survey I administered in Bulgaria in the 
summer of 2012. Its focus is on the sources of funding and empowerment as well as the relative 
strength of the CSO sector before and after the EU accession.  The survey was administered in 
person and via email and featured leaders of specific CSOs (6), journalists (3), academics (4), 
and businessmen (2). Third, I present a qualitative study on Bulgaria based on interviews with 
key actors in the CSO sector and archival research conducted in the summers of 2011 and 2012. 
The purpose of this case study is to identify the causal mechanisms through which the publicity 
of corruption that NGOs create introduces incentives for government officials to reform. The 
qualitative data that I collected allowed me to conduct detailed historical process tracing and 
draw the causal lines between the availability of funding, the actual anti-corruption projects, and 
the specific reforms that the government implemented before and after accession. 
Using the data from the interviews and the archival research I show that anti-corruption 
CSOs were more involved in anti-corruption activity before EU accession. Such activity 
included both greater partnerships with the government trying to implement an anti-corruption 
strategy and eventually evaluate it (monitoring) as well as greater opportunities for criticism 
through policy advocacy and exposing questionable government activities. In making these 
arguments I present two mini case studies linking CSOs to specific reforms prior to 2007. 
Similarly, I also present how funding problems in the post-accession period limited CSOs 
capacity to exert influence. The mini case studies focus on the Center for Economic 
Development (CED) and the Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD), but the analysis features 
others as well, such as the Open Society Institute and Bolkan Assist.  
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Results 
 As a starting point it is useful to look at the strength of the civil society sector in CEE. I 
use the Civil Society measure from the Freedom House Nations in Transit dataset
7
, which taps 
into the “organizational capacity and financial sustainability, and the legal and political 
environment” in which civil society groups operate (NIT, 2010). Importantly, in this Freedom 
house index lower values indicate greater strength of the sector. Thus, to make the graphs easier 
to read I have relabeled the index Civil Society Weakness clarifying that a decreasing trend 
means that the weakness of the sector also decreases. Figures 1 and 1.1 below illustrate the 
evolution of Bulgarian civil society and Bulgarian corruption control (higher values indicate 
better corruption control) between 1997 and 2011. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
7
 The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing the highest and 7 the lowest level of democratic 
progress. For more information, see http://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/nations-transit#.U1wHIPldWL0 
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Figure 1: Bulgarian civil society weakness before and after EU accession (2007) 
 
Source: Civil Society Index, Freedom House. Available at: 
http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/bulgaria, accessed on September 9, 2013  
 
Figure 1.1: Bulgarian corruption control before and after EU accession 
 
Source: Control of Corruption Index 1997-2011, World Bank. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, accessed on January 7, 2015 
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There are two interesting trends in this graph. First is the clear high correlation between 
civil society weakness and corruption control in the pre-accession period (Correlation 
Coefficient = -0.84) and the lack of such strong relationship the post-accession (Correlation 
Coefficient = -0.12). Second, while evidently civil society in Bulgaria has not regressed or 
backslided per se after 2007, it has also not continued to improve. In all the four years after 
Bulgaria’s EU accession the strength of the sector has remained stagnant at 2.5. Similarly, 
corruption control has at best only modestly improved in this time period. The 2012 Freedom 
House Nations in Transit (NIT) report points at the lack of financial stability as the main reason 
for the stagnation: “the ability of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to raise funds 
domestically remains limited, impeding the emergence of rich feedback links between NGOs and 
local communities.
8” Interestingly, the 2007 report, the last time when Bulgarian civil society 
showed any signs of progress, also stresses this problem and delineates the issues that would end 
up haunting the sector with remarkable predictive capacity: “Over the last 17 years, Bulgaria has 
managed to develop a vibrant civil society. However, the nongovernmental organization (NGO) 
sector has still not developed sustainable fund-raising mechanisms. The Bulgarian civil society 
sector was formed with a top-down approach, led by donor demands and visions and not by 
Bulgarian citizens. This is the major reason most NGOs are still heavily dependent on foreign 
donors and do not enjoy public support. A significant number of large foreign NGOs and their 
donors began to withdraw from Bulgaria in 2006, which will likely cause funding problems for 
some organizations …. On the other hand, the accession of Bulgaria to the EU will open new 
funding possibilities to Bulgarian NGOs. New challenges are arising in developing special skills 
and capacity for writing project proposals and managing projects under the strict and 
                                                          
8
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2012/bulgaria (accessed on December 20, 2013). 
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bureaucratic rules of the European Commission.”9 Impressively, this analysis written in 2007 
sums up nicely the problems the sector has continued to experience ever since.  
Importantly, the trend of a stagnating or mildly backsliding civil society development 
after membership and a slowdown (or backsliding) in corruption control is not unique to 
Bulgaria. It is generalizable to eight out of the ten post-communist countries that joined in 2004-
07 (with only Poland where corruption improved significantly after accession despite lack of 
further development of its (otherwise very strong) civil society sector and Estonia where civil 
society improved slightly but corruption control remained largely unchanged after its accession). 
Graphs on all ten countries displaying these trends are available in Appendix A.  
 
Time Series 
 The statistical part of this study utilizes a panel data approach to examine the effects of 
civil society weakness on corruption in the CEE countries before and after accession. Data on 
corruption control and a number of alternative explanations which may affect corruption (Table 
1) are available for the ten post-communist EU members over the period 1997-2011. Appendix B 
details the operationalization of the dependent and independent variables.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
9
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/2007/bulgaria (accessed on December 22, 2013). 
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Table 1: Alternative Explanations 
Drivers of Corruption Studies Identifying these factors Relationship 
Civil Society Weakness Karklins (2005) A vibrant civil society serves as a 
check on corruption 
Economic Development Sandholtz and Gray (2003) Effect varies among low, middle 
and high-income countries 
Competition Ades and Di Tella (1999) Open economies must be less 
corrupt 
Level of Democracy Montinola and Jackman (2002) Democratic practices inhibit 
corruption 
Freedom of the Press Karkins (2005) Independent media is a check on 
corruption 
Abundance of Natural 
Resources 
Ades and Di Tella (1999) Abundance of natural resources 
may create opportunities for rent 
seeking 
Neighborhood Diffusion 
Effects 
Sandholtz and Gray (2003) Corruption is higher in countries 
surrounded by corrupt neighbors 
Size of the Public sector LaPalombara (1994) Greater size of the public sector is 
negatively correlated to corruption 
control 
 
Model specification 
To test whether civil society weakness had a differential effect on corruption control 
before and after accession I run two time series models each focusing on one of the two periods. 
Time series data presents an array of challenges to researchers. Autocorrelation in the time 
dimension within units can lead to inefficient estimates and biased standard errors. Structural 
issues related to the units’ distinct histories can cause biased and inconsistent estimators. In order 
to control for autocorrelation and for the possibility of an omitted variable bias due to unit 
effects, I include a lagged dependent variable in both the pre- and post-accession models (Keele 
and Kelly, 2006; Beck and Katz, 2011). Furthermore, because TSCS data typically displays 
contemporaneous correlation across units and unit level heteroskedastisity, I also employ panel-
corrected standard errors (Beck and Katz, 1995). This diminishes the possibility of making 
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incorrect inferences from the standard errors. The results presented in the table below are robust 
to jackknifing and bootstrapping.  
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Table 2: Effects of Civil Society Weakness on Corruption Control Before and After EU 
Accession 
Drivers Before Accession After Accession 
Lagged Corruption Control 
.809*** 
(.025) 
.984*** 
(.059) 
Lagged Civil Society Weakness 
-.067** 
(.031) 
.041 
(.042) 
Economic Development -.003 
(.003)     
.001 
(.001) 
Neighbors’ corruption 1.528***   
(.149)   
-.512** 
(.227)   
Size of the Public sector .002*** 
(.001)      
.001 
(.001)      
Competition -.002 
(.001)     
-.001 
(.001)     
Natural resources -.040** 
(.016)      
.015 
(0.33)      
Level of democracy (“Freedom in the 
World” score) 
-.038 
(.079)    
.038 
(.074)    
Freedom of the press -.001 
(.009)  
-.019* 
(.012)  
Constant .833* 
(.439) 
.689 
(.553) 
R-squared 0.95 0.95 
Number of Observations 52 74 
Before accession and After accession Models are LDV regressions with panel-corrected standard 
errors. ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .10. One-tailed tests where appropriate.  
The results of the two models (before and after accession) confirm the hypotheses that 
civil society has a positive and significant effect on corruption control before accession but 
becomes insignificant after accession. The negative coefficient of the civil society weakness 
variable in the before accession model is to be expected, since in this NIT index, higher scores 
correspond to less power suggesting that for a unit increase in civil society weakness (decrease in 
civil society strength) we have a decrease in corruption control. The post-accession model shows 
no significant relationship between civil society and corruption. A number of control variables, 
including neighboring countries’ corruption, size of the public sector, and abundance of natural 
resources before accession and neighboring countries’ corruption after accession, are also found 
to be significant drivers of corruption. Although they are of no particular interest in the present 
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study, these control variables have signs and levels of statistical significance broadly consistent 
with theory and prior studies.  
The results of the statistical analysis and the descriptive country graphs in Appendix A 
suggest that the trend of stagnating or increasing civil society weakness after accession and 
slower progress in corruption control shown in Figures 1 and 1.1 is one that is generalizable 
beyond the context of Bulgaria. There are reasons, however, that justify looking at the Bulgarian 
case in some more detail. First, Bulgaria is the country where the corruption climate after 
accession worsened most significantly. Only a year after joining the EU and within the first 
attempts of disbursement of structural funds, blatant corruption schemes in the management of 
the funds were exposed. As a result the Commission froze a substantial amount of funds for 
Bulgaria thus drawing a direct link between the government’s low administrative capacity and its 
inability to tackle corruption. Second, the EU’s rules for applying for funding are universal for 
all members, so looking at how these rules may inhibit the ability of anti-corruption CSOs to 
apply for grants in any one country (especially the one whose corruption problems are the most 
serious) can reveal to a large extent the causal story in all.  
Thus, in order to shed more light on the causal story on why anti-corruption CSOs in 
CEE were able to influence policy outcomes more effectively before 2007 and why their 
capacities decreased after 2007, I now turn to the results of the survey as well as two case studies 
featuring two of the most influential CSOs in Bulgaria – the smaller but very active CED and the 
bigger and more established CSD 
 
 
34 
 
Survey results 
The results of the survey confirm the main expectations outlined above. First of all, the 
fifteen experts overwhelmingly agree that the EU accession process strengthened the CSO sector 
in Bulgaria and that CSOs had a strong collective impact on the battle against corruption before 
accession.  
Figure 2: EU pre-accession effect on NGOs and NGO’s impact on Corruption 
 
In answering how exactly the pre-accession period empowered the civil society sector, 
the experts are unanimous that the presence of more donors was crucial. In terms of the EU in 
particular, 74% identify the participatory rights given by the EU as important in the 
empowerment of CSOs. 53% agree that direct funding from the EU was key with only 26% 
disagreeing. Indirect funding conditional on cooperation with the state or local governments is 
identified as a more prominent mechanism: 66% agree and only 13% disagree. Providing more 
expertise and opportunities for cooperation is identified as a strong mechanism of empowerment 
by 33% of the experts with 27% disagreeing.  
47% 
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Table 3: Drivers of CSO Empowerment before Accession 
  
Strongly 
agree Agree No opinion Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
More Donors 80% 20% 0% 0% 0%   
              
Participatory Rights 54% 20% 7% 20% 0%   
              
Direct EU Funding 20% 33% 20% 13% 13%   
    
    
  
Indirect funding conditional 33% 33% 20% 13% 0%   
    
    
  
More expertise and 
cooperation 13% 20% 40% 27% 0%   
 
Discussing the post-accession period, an overwhelming majority, 87%, thinks that the 
collective impact of the CSO sector on the effort to curb corruption is weaker providing evidence 
for part one of my argument.  Another overwhelming majority of 80% claims that there are 
fewer funding opportunities in the post-accession period.  
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Figure 3: NGO Collective impact after Membership and Sources after accession 
 
The table below provides further insight into the reasons why experts believe the 
availability and acquisition of financial resources is more limited in the post-accession period. 
Some 80% specify the absence of as many donors as before accession as the main reason for lack 
of resources providing evidence for part two of my argument. Another majority of 80% points at 
the EU’s insistence on the partnership principle requiring CSOs to go through the complex and 
lengthy bureaucratic processes of the state when applying for EU funding. About half the experts 
suggest that the difficulty to apply for grants directly (given the matching funds and transnational 
network requirements) is another impediment to financial stability for CSOs. These results are in 
line with part three of my argument.  
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Table 4: Reasons why access to funding sources became more difficult after accession 
  
Strongly 
agree Agree 
No 
opinion Disagree 
Strongly 
disagree 
Fewer donors present 66% 14% 0% 20% 0% 
    
    Control of state government over 
selection of EU fundees 47% 33% 7% 7% 0% 
    
    Higher bureaucratic  and financial 
burden to apply for grants 
individually 27% 20% 20% 33% 0% 
 
Selecting anti-corruption NGOs for process tracing 
The case selection pertaining to the process tracing is based on the survey responses of 
the 15 NGO experts. Each of them was asked to assign a score between 2 and -2 to each of the 
more prominent anti-corruption organizations depending on whether they believed the 
organization was highly important in terms of anti-corruption activity (2), important (1), of low 
importance (-1) or not important (-2), with 0 meaning “no opinion”. Additionally, the experts 
provided these scores for the pre-accession and post-accession periods separately. After all 
scores were collected they were averaged to produce a composite score. The results are presented 
in the graphs below.  
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Figure 4: Relevance score of various Bulgarian anti-corruption CSOs before and after accession 
 
 
Source: Survey data; 15 NGO experts, 2012 
 
While eight of the nine organizations were identified as having a strong impact on the 
fight against corruption prior to accession, four of these become considerably less important in 
the post-accession period. The variance in relevance among the major anti-corruption CSOs 
between the two periods is also supported by the difference in standard deviations: 11.75 before 
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accession and 14.61 after. Furthermore, a difference of means test shows statistical significance 
at the 0.05 level for every single CSOs when the mean scores for the two periods were 
compared.  
 
Table 5: Descriptive Statistics and Difference of Means Test 
  Before Accession After Accession   
  Sum Mean Media
n 
StdD Sum Mean Media
n 
StdD P(T<=t) 
difference of 
means 
CSD 30 2.00 2 0.00 20 1.34 2 1.04 0.027* 
TI 28 1.87 2 0.35 17 1.13 1 0.99 0.000* 
CED 18 1.20 1 0.41 -9 -0.60 -1 0.74 0.000* 
Open Society 25 1.66 2 0.48 15 1.00 1 1.13 0.012* 
CLS 21 1.40 1 0.50 6 0.40 0 0.74 0.000* 
CSP -7 -0.40 0 1.18 -14 -0.93 -1 0.96 0.029* 
IME 7 0.47 1 0.74 -9 -0.60 -1 0.82 0.002* 
Bolkan Assist 10 0.67 1 0.62 -13 -0.87 -1 0.51 0.000* 
Coali for 
Sustain Dev 
15 0.86 1 0.35 -13 -0.87 -1 0.35 0.000* 
 
Case studies 
In order to get a sense of what factors may have caused the decline of relevance in these 
four CSOs, I compare one of them (CED) to one that remained highly relevant after 2007 (CSD). 
This comparison aims to also shed more light on the various mechanisms CSOs use to exert 
influence and to explain why the changing institutional conditions post-accession have affected 
some organizations more than others.  
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Center for Economic Development (CED) 
The Center for Economic Development was far more able to exert influence targeted at 
corruption control before the accession to the EU. There were two main reasons for this. First, 
the organization had access to more and more variable funding sources with more simplified 
procedures for applying for funds. This increased its independent capacity for action. Second, 
due to explicit EU requirements and the fact that the country was still on the accession queue, 
there was greater willingness by the state and local governments to cooperate on various projects 
pertaining to corruption control. After accession, limited funding opportunities beyond the EU 
and complicated procedures for applying for EU grants decreased the capacity of the 
organization to induce policy change.  
During the accession period, the EU encouraged NGOs to participate in the political 
process and alert the Commission of various challenges. Thus, in 2002-03 CED championed the 
“Transparency of the public auctions” project which led to several publications outlining the 
underlying reasons for corruption in this field as well as suggested measures that should be taken 
to eliminate it. This advocacy project was sponsored by the Open Society Institute and the Soros 
Foundation and raised awareness about the problem resulting in the explicit inclusion of this 
issue in the EU Commission Regular Reports for the next few years until the Bulgarian 
government took measures to ameliorate the problem on the eve of accession. Thus, the EU’s 
encouragement to identify issues that need attention combined with the availability of funds 
through external donors, strengthened the CED capacity in the accession period.  
The availability of funding in this period resulted into another meaningful project in 2004 
– “Encouraging the Collaboration between businesses and NGOs to curb corruption in the 
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Velingrad municipality”, financed by USAID (expert interview, Summer 2012). The project led 
to the development of sustainable monitoring and communication mechanisms through which 
business organizations and local authorities can identify and target corrupt practices. The project 
was so successful that the EU was willing to provide more funding through its PHARE 
programme to expand its scope and include another 12 municipalities. The PHARE funding was 
conditional on the cooperation of national and subnational governments with different businesses 
and NGOs (Bruszt, 2008; Gasior-Niemiec, 2010; Grosse, 2010), which made both the 
willingness and the capacity of these actors to cooperate more pronounced.  
While funding available through the EU and other sources strengthened the capacity of 
CED in that time period, its operational logic also opened a can of worms for what was to follow 
after accession. As other external donors withdrew from Bulgaria after 2007, conditional funding 
through the EU became the dominant avenue for NGOs to secure financing. Thus, in 2009 for 
example, millions of euros of structural funds were spent on partnerships between local 
governments and NGOs promoting anti-corruption, while at the same time the EC was cutting 
Bulgaria’s funds for fraud. NGOs quickly realized that gaining access to structural funds directly 
was going to be extremely difficult unless they formed partnerships with local governments. But 
who will then expose these local governments if they misappropriate the funds? As Mungiu-
Pippidi (2010) claims, “If funding is distributed only through governments, the EU deliberately 
gives up any expectation that civil society can act as a permanent monitor and auditor of public 
spending” (The Experience of Civil Society as an Anticorruption Actor in East Central Europe, 
p.29). Expectedly, the willingness of local governments to co-apply with CED for anti-
corruption-related projects with the EU after 2007 decreased. In fact CED has not been able to 
get the cooperation of the state or a local government for any anti-corruption projects after 2007. 
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Furthermore, having lost valuable staff members after accession (now down to nine) the 
organization has found it difficult to master the elaborate EU grant application process operated 
by the state administration. As its other donors (most notably USAID) withdrew and the 
opportunities for funding through the EU became more limited (due to their conditional nature 
and the state’s limited willingness to cooperate and the “gatekeeping” role of the Bulgarian 
state), the capacity of CED to exert influence drastically decreased, thus providing evidence for 
parts two and three of my argument.  
Bolkan Assist dealt with similar types of pressures. According to one of the interviewed 
experts, the organization was “unlucky” enough to actually qualify for funding for one of its 
projects through the Structural funds. The bureaucratic hurdles that the state administration 
created then in terms of requiring additional materials were quite substantial to put it mildly. The 
organization struggled to meet all requirements and its employees found the process 
“exhausting” and “demeaning”. Eventually, it took more than a year until Bolkan Assist received 
the funds that it had rightfully qualified for (expert interview, Summer 2011).   
The figures below provide a graphical illustration of CED’s declining capacity to engage 
in anti-corruption activity post-accession.  
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Figure 5: CED Number of Corruption-related projects 
 
Source: http://ced.bg/projects.php, accessed on January 1, 2013 
 
Figure 5.1: CED Percentage of Corruption-related projects 
 
Source: http://ced.bg/projects.php, accessed on January 1, 2013 
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Figure 6: CED Number of Corruption-related publications 
 
Source: http://ced.bg/publications.php, accessed on January 1, 2013 
 
Figure 6.1: CED Percentage of Corruption-related publications 
 
Source: http://ced.bg/publications.php, accessed on January 1, 2013 
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Using corruption-related projects and publications as a proxy for the relevance of the 
organization in the fight against corruption, the graphs show a sharp decline in capacity after 
2007 as the organization has engaged in almost no anti-corruption activity. 
 Thus, before accession 27% of the CED projects and 14% of its publications were 
corruption-related while after 2007 these numbers were 0% and 5% respectively with the NGO 
issuing only two corruption-related publications in 2012. Before accession, these projects and 
publications served as an important mechanism to exert influence by means of both monitoring 
and advocacy. They were presented at official events, with great media coverage (at the Boyana 
residence formerly the residence of Todor Zhivkov), with ambassadors, representatives from the 
business community, and ministers present (expert interview Summer, 2012). The publicity of 
these presentations created pressure that often resulted in explicit government action. After 
accession, however, with no official projects and few publications, CED has resorted to other 
means to advancing its mission. Importantly, this has not been due to lack of initiative or 
willingness as plenty of proposed projects lay idly waiting on the shelf for lack of funding.  
This is not to say that CED exerts no influence on the fight against corruption after 
accession. In the context of no funded anti-corruption projects, the organization is still trying to 
influence the political process through alternative mechanisms that mainly focus on monitoring. 
Between 2006 and 2009, for example, it was invited along with four other prominent NGOs to 
write evaluations on the implementation of the Anti-corruption strategy of the Saxe-Koburg 
government and concluded that the strategy has failed. Overall, however, there is no doubt that 
its relevance after 2007 has diminished.  
 The survey data that I collected from Bulgarian NGO experts further reinforces the 
notion of CED’s declining capacity.  
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Figure 7: CED before accession 
 
Figure 7.1: CED after accession 
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The surveyed experts agree that CED was one of the very important NGOs in the fight against 
corruption prior to 2007. Remarkably, only 13% have the same opinion about the post-accession 
period, and an overwhelming 73% think that the organization is of low importance in this time 
period.  
Center for the Study of Democracy (CSD) 
The CED experience is the modal experience of most grass-roots Bulgarian anti-
corruption CSOs that were not embedded in extensive international networks and had to develop 
their capacities somewhat independently. Importantly, the capacity of bigger and more powerful 
organizations, such as the Center for the Study of Democracy, has also declined post-accession, 
though less drastically. Since 1998 CSD has been the champion of anti-corruption initiative 
among all NGOs in Bulgaria. It has benefited from the pre-accession process by getting both 
direct and conditional funding from the EU and USAID for various anti-corruption projects and 
by developing collaborations with like-minded organizations on the EU level. It is exactly this 
factor that sets it apart from the majority of the other (smaller) anti-corruption NGOs in Bulgaria, 
who having failed to develop strong international networks and bureaucracies or grass-root 
support, became incapacitated upon the departure of their external donors in 2007. Among 
CSD’s extensive network of partners are the World Bank, the Heritage Foundation, the Konrad 
Adenauer Stiftung, the Friedrich Ebert Stiftung etc.
10
 
During the pre-accession period CSD had access to substantial resources provided by 
USAID and other external donors. For example between 2002 and 2005 USAID disbursed $9.76 
million to CSD and the DPK Consulting Center as part of the Anti- Corruption Open 
                                                          
10
 http://www.csd.bg/index.php?id=183 (accessed on December 20, 2013). 
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Government Initiative 
11
. The main focus of the programme was strengthening and streamlining 
public procurement, internal controls and government audit systems. CSD played a leading role 
in the project and published an elaborate case study drawing public attention to the problems 
with the Public Procurement Register. It pointed out that the removal of the Public Procurement 
Register from the mandate of the courts is a necessary anti-corruption measure (expert interview, 
Summer 2011). Until that moment if “anyone wanted to check whether a firm was clean, 
whether it had debt, or was being sued, they could have gotten this information only after a court 
hearing” (expert interview, Summer 2011). CSD lobbied the US Embassy and the US State 
Department, which exerted tremendous pressure on the Bulgarian government until the register 
was removed from the courts’ jurisdiction (The Public Procurement Law, in force since October 
1, 2004). CSD was involved in every step of the way first lobbying for the change (advocacy), 
then participating in the actual crafting of the legislation, and finally providing input to 
parliamentary committees reviewing the proposed reform. As a result the new register reinforced 
the principles of “transparency and openness” and “will be a vehicle for connecting Bulgaria to 
the EU internal market, fostering a “higher level of trust in Bulgaria” and encouraging additional 
investment.
12
 Thus, due to its stable financial situation, CSD was able to sponsor real anti-
corruption reforms and measures before 2007. 
After 2007 its financial capacity decreased slightly mainly triggered by the departure of 
USAID as a sponsor, but its ability to influence policy persisted. One of its main projects 
immediately after accession was the closing of the duty free gas stations on the Turkish, 
Macedonian, and Serbian borders. Having developed a wide transnational network of contacts 
and with as many as 41 full-time staff members, CSD was able to remain competitive in the 
                                                          
11
 http://bulgaria.usaid.gov/113/28/product.html (accessed on January 23, 2013). 
 
12
 http://bulgaria.usaid.gov/anti-corruption/page.html (accessed on January 23, 2013). 
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grant application processes. Obtaining funding from both the British Embassy and the EU (with 
the British embassy helping meet the EU requirement of matching grants), CSD produced a 
study showing that close to 40% of all gas sales in Bulgaria comes from duty free stations as the 
massive traffic from Turkey to Austria through Serbia takes advantage of these opportunities 
leading to huge foregone revenues for the state (expert interview, Summer 2011). After 
establishing the issue, CSD made it a topic of public debate through publications and press-
conferences. As a result the subject entered the EU’s Regular Report as well as the US State 
Department Annual Report in 2007. Eventually, a deadline of February 2008 for the closure of 
these stations was set by the Bulgarian government.  
So what makes the CSD more special? How was it able to continue to be influential after 
accession even as most other NGOs were seeing their capacities decline? The organization’s 
ability to effectively switch its main income source from USAID to the EU allowed it to continue 
to exert pressure for reform. Although it encountered similar problems as all other NGOs 
(needing to forge alliances with the government and/or having to form transnational coalitions to 
apply for funding), its access to transnational networks and its better bureaucratic capacity 
enabled it to successfully apply for EU funding.  
The table below illustrates the ability of CSD to remain financially stable after accession 
by retaining a steady revenue stream even after USAID’s withdrawal in 2008. Importantly, 
USAID grants averaged 40% of the CSD revenue during the years in which the agency was 
financing the NGO. Furthermore, although the EU’s contributions have historically accounted to 
only 29% in the 10 years of data, its share after accession was 47% demonstrating its dominance 
in this period. One can also observe the steady increasing trend in percentage of projects 
sponsored by the EU climbing from 8% in 2001 to 67% in 2011.  
50 
 
Table 6: CSD Grants by sponsor 
CSD Grants 
Year 
Grants 
BGL 
EU 
Grants 
%EU 
Grants 
USAID 
Grants 
%USAID 
Grants 
EU 
projects 
Other 
projects 
%EU 
projects 
2001 1853 113 6% 916 49% 1 11 8% 
2002 1565 122 8% 586 37% 1 7 13% 
2003 3196 472 15% 2050 64% 3 13 19% 
2004 1980 372 19% 1045 53% 2 12 14% 
2005 1157 552 48% 157 14% 3 14 18% 
2006 1122 142 13% 535 48% 2 16 11% 
2007 886 227 26% 386 44% 3 10 23% 
2008 471 162 34% 64 14% 4 5 44% 
2009 662 219 33% 0 0% 3 7 30% 
2010 959 545 57% 0 0% 3 3 50% 
2011 1157 756 65% 0 0% 8 4 67% 
Total 15008 3682   5739   33 102   
Source: CSD Annual reports 2001-2011. 
Figure 8 below displays the relationship between the funding from the EU and USAID and the 
effective switch in dominance in 2008, when USAID withdrew.  
Figure 8: USAID and EU grants to CSD 2001-2011 
 
Source: CSD Annual reports 2001-2011. 
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*(The peak in EU funding in 2005 is due to a one-time grant of 362,000 BGL by the EU 
Commission to promote human rights and establish an ombudsman institution in Bulgaria) 
 
Although financial stability has definitely enabled CSD to remain a force in Bulgaria’s battle 
against corruption, its declining absolute revenue in the first few years after accession has 
impacted its ability to be as influential as before. Figures 9 and 9.1 below display a declining 
trend in corruption-related publications after 2007. 
 
Figure 9: CSD publications 2002-2012 
 
Source: http://www.csd.bg/index.php?id=162, accessed on January 1, 2013 
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Figure 9.1: Percentage Corruption-related publications by CSD 2002-2012 
 
Source: http://www.csd.bg/index.php?id=162, accessed on January 1, 2013 
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corruption-related publications of another major Bulgarian CSO, whose financial stability was 
not compromised by the EU accession – the Open Society Institute. As displayed by Figures 10 
and 10.1 below, the situation is similar.  
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Figure 10: Open Society publications 2002-2012 
 
Source: http://www.osf.bg/?cy=38&lang=1, accessed on January 9, 2013 
 
Figure 10.1: Percentage Corruption-related publications by Open Society 2002-2012 
 
Source: http://www.osf.bg/?cy=38&lang=1, accessed on January 9, 2013 
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though to a more limited extent. This intuition is reinforced by the expert survey, which also 
suggests a somewhat decreased influence for CSD after accession.  
 
Figure 11: CSD before accession 
 
Figure 12: CSD after accession 
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As one can see, CSD is undoubtedly still a major anti-corruption actor. However, 40% of the 
experts no longer place it as among the most important actors, while they unanimously agreed 
that its influence before accession was among the strongest. The results for Open Society seem 
similar with a healthy minority doubting the relevance of the organization in the post-accession 
period, an increase from 0% before to 20% after.   
 
Figure 13: OS before accession 
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Figure 14: OS after accession 
 
Conclusion 
 This article pursues two fundamental objectives. First, it explains the underlying reasons 
behind the strengthening of the civil society sector in Eastern Europe before accession as well as 
its eventual stagnation after membership. Second, it reveals the types of mechanisms through 
which CSOs influenced anti-corruption activity, namely monitoring and advocacy.  
So, what were the reasons behind the weakening of the CSO sector after EU 
membership? The withdrawal of most external donors and the requirements for government 
collaboration to apply for EU funding post-accession constituted structural changes which 
decreased the capacities of all anti-corruption CSOs. Due to the top-down nature of the funding 
process pre-accession, no CSO was able to build an independent capacity to raise funds 
domestically. Thus, after this change in the institutional environment, only the bigger 
organizations that had developed transnational networks and internal bureaucratic capacities to 
follow complicated application procedures continued to play an important role.  
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Initially, the EU pre-accession process provided good opportunities for CSOs to get 
involved and exert influence on policy outcomes. Explicit requirements for cooperation with 
governments and conditional funding provided strong incentives for both local governments and 
CSOs to work together towards common goals. The two sectors collaborated and state and local 
governments were eager to craft proposals and implement measures pertaining to decreasing 
corruption. Both smaller and bigger CSOs played a meaningful role in this time period as the 
strength of the sector was increasing and corruption levels were falling. Once a country was 
accepted to the EU, however, the partnership requirements of the EU accidentally became a 
mechanism of curtailing the capacity of CSOs to pressure for anti-corruption reform. No longer 
fearful of the possibility of membership denial, the government actively sought to create 
bureaucratic hurdles for CSOs either proposing projects or obtaining the funding for projects that 
had already been approved. This, combined with the lack of availability of alternative funding 
sources, paralyzed many smaller CSOs.  
In terms of mechanism and modes of inducing change, CSOs have engaged in different 
forms of monitoring and advocacy including publications and projects, lobbying, and directly 
contacting the EU. Importantly, it seems that the most significant policy changes, such as 
establishing a transparent Public Procurement Register in Bulgaria (in 2005) or crafting a new 
Public Procurement Law (in 2004), take place after CSOs provide powerful external actors like 
the EU and the US with information and tools to exert pressure on the government.  
So, is there hope for the stagnant civil society sector in CEE? Yes, and the hope lies in 
Brussels. The key to revival is for the EU to remove the funds application process from the grip 
of domestic governments, which do not want anti-corruption funded and would methodically 
create barriers preventing CSOs from getting funded and exposing them. Given the close 
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correlation between corruption control and strength of civil society it seems that this would be 
the sensible way to restore some of these countries’ more hopeful pre-accession anti-corruption 
track record.  
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APPENDIX A: Civil Society Weakness and Corruption Control in the 10 post-communist 
countries of the 5
th
 Enlargement 1997-2011
13
 
 
 
 
                                                          
13
 Civil Society Index 1997-2011, Freedom House. The index runs from 1 to 7 with higher values corresponding to 
worse outcomes (greater weakness). Available at: 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/, accessed on 09.09.13 
Control of Corruption Index 1997-2011, World Bank. The index runs from -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. Available at: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, accessed 
on 07.09.14 
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A1: Cross-validation: Civil Society Weakness and Corruption in the in the 10 post-
communist countries of the 5
th
 Enlargement 1999-2012 as measured by Freedom House
14
 
Czech civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
14
 Civil Society Index and Corruption Index, Freedom House. Available at: 
 http://www.freedomhouse.org/country/, accessed on 09.09.13. Note: The Freedom House Corruption index is 
different from the World Bank index in that it shows corruption levels (higher values mean more corruption) as 
opposed to the World Bank’s corruption control (higher values mean less corruption).  
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Romanian civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
 
Slovakian civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
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Hungarian civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
 
Polish civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
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Slovenian civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
 
Estonian civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
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Latvian civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
 
Lithuanian civil society and corruption levels before and after EU accession 
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APPENDIX B: Variable measurement and Descriptive Statistics 
Table B.1: Variable Measurement  
Civil Society 
Weakness 
The Freedom House Civil Society Index. The index assesses the growth of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and 
financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they 
function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in 
the policy process. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing 
the highest and 7 the lowest level of civil society strength. They follow a quarter-
point scale. Minor to moderate developments typically warrant a positive or 
negative change of a quarter point (0.25), while significant developments warrant 
a half point (0.50). It is rare for any category to fluctuate more than a half point in 
a single year. Source: Freedom House: 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-
2014#.VJnSNF4Co, accessed in July 2014.  
Corruption 
Control 
The Control of Corruption Index (one of the six World Governance Indicators 
(WGI)). The Control of Corruption Index is a composite governance indicator 
based on 32 underlying data sources.  These data sources are rescaled and 
combined to create an aggregate using an unobserved components model (UCM). 
The UCM assumes that the observed data from each source are a linear function 
of the unobserved level of governance, plus an error term.  This linear function is 
different for different data sources, and so corrects for the remaining non-
comparability of units of the rescaled data noted above.  The resulting estimates 
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of governance are a weighted average of the data from each source, with weights 
reflecting the pattern of correlation among data sources.   The UCM assigns 
greater weight to data sources that tend to be more strongly correlated with each 
other.  While this weighting improves the statistical precision of the aggregate 
indicators, it typically does not affect very much the ranking of countries on the 
aggregate indicators.  The composite measures of corruption control generated by 
the UCM are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard 
deviation of one, and running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. The measure is useful as a tool for broad cross-
country comparisons and for evaluating broad trends over time. Source: World 
Bank: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, accessed in July 
2014.  
Economic 
Development 
Annual percentages of constant price GDP are year-on-year changes; the base 
year is country-specific. Expenditure-based GDP is total final expenditures at 
purchasers’ prices (including the f.o.b. value of exports of goods and services), 
less the f.o.b. value of imports of goods and services. Source: Economist 
Intelligence Unit, World Development Indicators. 
Competition Percent change in volume of imports of goods and services. Percent change of 
volume of imports refers to the aggregate change in the quantities of total imports 
whose characteristics are unchanged. The goods and services and their prices are 
held constant, therefore changes are due to changes in quantities only.  Source: 
World Bank. 
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Neighbor’s 
corruption 
Average corruption score of neighboring countries, as calculated from the World 
Bank’s Control of Corruption index. Source: Author. 
Level of 
Democracy 
Average of political rights and civil liberties scores in Freedom House's "Freedom 
in the World" report. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in 
legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and 
organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public 
policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the 
freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. Each country and 
territory is assigned a numerical rating—on a scale of 1 to 7—for political rights 
and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a rating of 1 indicates the highest 
degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom.  Source: Freedom House: 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VKlrkivF93E,  
accessed in December 2014.   
Size of the 
Public Sector 
General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. Total 
expenditure consists of total expense and the net acquisition of nonfinancial 
assets. Source: World Bank. 
Freedom of 
the Press 
Score on Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Press” report. The Freedom of the 
Press index, an annual survey of media independence in 197 countries and 
territories, is at the core of Freedom House's press freedom project. The index 
assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in 
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the world, analyzing the events of each calendar year. It provides numerical 
rankings and rates each country's media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free”, so 
higher scores correspond to less freedom 
Source: Freedom House: https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-
press#.VKloGyvF93E, accessed in November 2014. 
Abundance 
of Natural 
Resources 
Production of minerals and utilities as a percentage of GDP Source: United 
Nations Statistical Division. 
 
Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure/Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corruption Control 150 0.30                             0.41                             (0.68)                     1.31                                
Civil Society Weakness 160 1.95                             0.62                             1.25                       4.00                                
Economic Development 160 5.42                             12.18                           (59.69)                   121.90                           
Competition 157 7.37                             20.94                           (61.37)                   148.17                           
Size of the Public Sector 151 28.11                           14.07                           12.10                     82.08                             
Level of Democracy 160 1.42                             0.43                             1.00                       3.00                                
Freedom of the Press 160 53.45                           3.28                             50.00                     75.00                             
Natural Resources 152 3.48                             0.73                             2.25                       4.27                                
Neghbor's corruption 150 (0.23)                            0.10                             (0.42)                     (0.09)                              
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APPENDIX C: Examples of mechanisms of corruption control utilized by Bulgarian NGOs 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
NGO Year Name of Project Financier Tools invloved
Mechanism of 
corruption control Result
CED 2002-03
“Transparency of the public 
auctions” 
Open Society 
and Soros 
Foundation
publications advocacy
The issue was included in the EU's 
Regular Report
CED 2004
“Encouraging the Collaboration 
between businesses and NGOs 
to curb corruption in the 
Velingrad municipality”
USAID publications monitoring
The project was successful and EU 
showed interest in expaning the 
scope
CSD 2002-05
Anti- Corruption Open 
Government Initiative
USAID publications advocacy
The Public Procurement Register 
was removed from the mandate of 
the courts after pressure from the 
US and the EU
CSD 2007 Closing of duty free gas stations 
British Embassy 
and the EU
Analysis papers 
and publications
monitoring/advocacy
The subject was featured in the 
EU’s Regular Report as well as the 
US State Department Annual 
Report in 2007
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Chapter III: Corruption on the ropes: The effectiveness of EU leverage in fighting 
corruption in Central and Eastern Europe before and after accession 
 
The European Union’s (EU) eastern enlargement of 2004-07 marked a symbolic moment 
in Europe’s post-Cold War history. After more than a decade of difficult transitions ten Central 
and Eastern European (CEE) post-communist countries, finally broke free from their communist 
legacies and joined the ranks of the developed world. Authoritarianism and central planning were 
now buried in the past. Democracy and the free market were “the only game in town.” The task 
of reforming the CEE countries during the accession process was a challenging one. 
Nevertheless, the EU’s membership conditionality has been widely perceived as a highly 
effective means of influence. The promise of membership combined with the implementation of 
the 31 chapters of the acquis communautaire during the negotiations phase of the accession 
period has been credited with the overall alignment of the ten post-communist countries’ systems 
of governance, economies and legal structures with Western European standards. There is no 
doubt that during the accession period CEE countries had huge incentives to comply and 
collaborate with EU institutions. As a number of scholars have argued, however, these incentives 
may have decreased once membership was attained and the EU’s leverage correspondingly 
diminished. It is therefore unclear to what extent the EU has had a system-wide impact and 
continues to cause political and economic reform in new members after accession. In order to try 
to shed more light on this ongoing debate, I focus on the area of governance which is most likely 
to engender skepticism about the ability of the EU to inspire and sustain reform – government 
efforts to fight corruption.  
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Corruption was neither part of the acquis nor of the Copenhagen criteria thus presenting a 
challenge that external pressures on their own, and in the absence of a formal dimension, were 
unlikely to effectively address.  Furthermore, there were few domestic payoffs for politicians to 
show results and instead, especially in some countries, there were vast incentives for the political 
elites to collude and maintain the rent-seeking momentum they had adopted in the early 1990s. 
Therefore, in this article I ask whether the EU pre–accession process and post-accession 
pressures have been effective in the fight against corruption in the CEE countries. In other 
words, were corruption levels curbed during the pre-accession period and more importantly were 
any such gains sustained after that, when EU leverage diminished? I hypothesize that despite the 
prediction that gains during the pre-accession period would be modest and perhaps backsliding 
would take place after the membership is attained, the 10 post-communist countries have, on 
average, performed well both before and after accession. I employ time series analysis focusing 
on the time period 1996-2009 to substantiate this argument.  
In unpacking the causal mechanisms behind this dynamic, I also use historical process 
tracing and show that although corruption was neither part of the acquis nor explicitly of the 
Copenhagen criteria, it was an issue that received a lot of visibility during the pre-accession 
period through the Commission Regular Reports. Thus, taking advantage of its leverage, the EU 
was able to demand reforms that served to decrease corruption levels during the accession 
period.  
After accession gains in the fight against corruption were not negated as the relative loss 
of leverage in this time period was compensated by the combined effect of three causal 
mechanisms. First, there are positive pressures coming from continued leverage - conditional 
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Structural and Cohesion Funds and Cooperation and Verification Mechanism reports (in the 
cases of Bulgaria and Romania). Second, there is evidence of increased linkage - socialization 
effects leading to higher demands for accountability of public officials. Third, there are 
substantial spillover effects from implementing the acquis in other areas – the reduction of the 
role of the state in the economy, increasing bureaucratic capacity and improvements in the legal 
system.  
I explore the question of how corruption levels were influenced by the EU in several 
stages. First, I present the current state of play in the fight against corruption in CEE and explain 
why it is such a deeply-rooted challenge, detrimental to liberal democracy and endangering the 
cohesion of the EU. Second, I show how the findings of this study fall in line with the larger 
literature on EU leverage and post-accession compliance. Then, I present the theoretical 
framework that I utilize to formulate my hypotheses and explain my methodological approach 
including a discussion on the choice and operationalization of variables and the results of the 
time series analyses. Finally, I trace the exact causal mechanisms that were in play before and 
after accession and suggest some implications for EU policy-making.  
 
Corruption in CEE: The state of play 
The purpose of this section is to sketch the problem of corruption in post-communist 
Europe in three ways. First, I illustrate how the CEE countries are doing compared to other EU 
members while also showing some variation within the group of ten. Second, I summarize the 
main explanations of why corruption is so deeply-rooted in CEE. Third, I elaborate on why 
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corruption is detrimental for both liberal democracy and the cohesion of the EU and hence a 
crucial challenge to good governance.  
Although scholars have shown that by 2005 the performance of the eight post-communist 
countries that joined in 2004 on measures of political rights and civil liberties was virtually 
indistinguishable from that of the older EU members (Cameron, 2007), severe problems with 
corruption have remained salient in basically all these countries.
15
  Figure 1 below tracks the 
development of corruption levels in the group of eight who joined in 2004 as well as Bulgaria 
and Romania who joined in 2007 and the EU -15 from 1996 to 2009.  
 
Figure 1: Corruption levels in Percentile Ranks  
 
Note: World Government Indicators (WGI) 1996-2009, World Bank. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed on January 17, 2012); higher 
numbers indicate better performance 
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 http://www.transparency.org/research/cpi/overview#1 (accessed on August 2, 2014). 
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Both the group of eight and Bulgaria and Romania show improvement, narrowing the gap 
with the EU-15 substantially between 1996 and 2005. However, there seems to be a stasis in this 
trend after 2005. Croatia, which I have also included in this graph, as the most recent member of 
the EU, evolves similarly to the other post-communist members. There are two concerning 
trends that the graph portrays. First is the one of slowing reform, though no backsliding. Second 
is that these countries, especially Bulgaria and Romania, still exhibit corruption levels which are 
significantly higher than those of their Western European counterparts. From the EU point of 
view the lack of backsliding may seem encouraging, but the fact that these countries absolute 
levels still remain so high is unacceptable and the need for continued reform is, therefore, 
crucial.  
But why is there so much corruption in post-communist societies to start with? Two main 
explanations stand out: 1) the legacy of the planned economy has bred a culture of corruption 
that has prolonged itself past the democratic transition; 2) the transition created a window of 
opportunity (through privatization) that led to the emergence and entrenchment of a system of 
corrupt practices. Both explanations have been examined in the literature. Karklins (2005), 
Treisman (2003), and Holmes (2006) argue that the communist past of these countries has 
created a specific set of conditions and actors that adversely influence corruption levels. 
Sandhotlz and Taagepera (2005) show that the lack of competition, legacy of the planned 
economy, combined with ineffective bureaucratic supervision makes corruption ubiquitous. 
Hutchcroft (1997) and Holmes (2006) suggest that it has become a socially accepted norm that 
could not be changed overnight. At the same time there is evidence that privatization opened the 
door to numerous opportunities for corruption since the process itself was largely devised and 
managed by the administrators of the old regimes. This created a set of vested interests and 
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positions of power that effectively resisted further reforms (Sandhotlz and Taagepera, 2005). 
Thus, corruption is a systemic problem in CEE, whose foundations can be traced both to the 
post-communist transition and the communist period.  
Having demonstrated that corruption is a deeply-rooted and ongoing problem in CEE, let 
me summarize the reasons that justify focusing on it specifically when thinking about challenges 
to good governance. First of all, it undermines democratic institutions, reduces economic growth, 
and challenges liberal democracy – “as political elites violate the legal limits of their power, 
citizens lose trust in state institutions, and civil society is oppressed or co-opted by powerful 
networks” (Vachudova, 2009, p.44). Along the same lines, Richard Rose (2001, p.105) has 
called it “the greatest obstacle to progress in post-communist societies”. Furthermore, it 
endangers the integration and cohesion of the European Union in a way few other governance 
challenges do. First, if the Structural and Cohesion Funds that become available to new members 
after accession are not fairly allocated in the absence of mechanisms controlling corruption, they 
fail to adequately address the economic and infrastructural challenges these countries face and 
delay their effective integration in the Union. Additionally, while corruption undermines 
integration on the acceding country end, it also reduces support for enlargement in the older 
member states. As corruption scandals in CEE countries make more and more headlines, public 
support for the Union’s integration and further enlargement diminishes as both eastern and 
western European publics become skeptical of the EU. Thus, corruption is an important issue 
which deserves the attention of both policy-makers and academics.
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Challenges to post-accession compliance in various areas. Is corruption different? 
This section outlines the way my findings contribute to the literature on the way the EU 
has impacted domestic reforms in candidate countries. It is organized in two parts. First, I 
explain why some scholars would be skeptical about improvements in corruption levels in 
acceding countries. Here I also outline the findings of scholars who have found evidence of the 
decreasing effectiveness of EU conditionality after accession. Second, I address the positivist 
literature on post-accession compliance and show that the lack of backsliding in the ten post-
communist members’ fight against corruption that this paper identifies falls in line with the 
findings of several other researchers. 
Some scholars would be skeptical about potential improvements in corruption levels. 
Epstein and Seledmeier (2008), for example, convincingly argue that the power of EU 
conditionality would be the weakest in areas where the EU never applied specific conditionality, 
such as rules that are neither part of the acquis, nor of the Copenhagen criteria. Such is the case 
with corruption. Although the membership criteria do call, somewhat broadly, for developing 
institutional capacities to curb corruption and organized crime, corruption is neither part of the 
acquis, nor of the Copenhagen criteria. Some scholarly evidence suggests that this is not 
coincidental since there was never a consensus among the older member states to push or 
emphasize the issue (Vachudova, 2009) and some Council members systematically tried to avoid 
it. Jacoby (2004) also contributes to the argument that the density of EU rules in each area of 
reform predetermines its success and longevity. He compares regional and healthcare policy and 
finds that the sector characterized by more extensive external pressure (stronger EU 
conditionality), regional policy, made greater progress towards approximating Western European 
models. The high level of outside incentives and the relative scarcity of domestic actors in the 
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case of regional policy (as opposed to healthcare) compelled and enabled some CEE 
governments to implement the EU’s regional policy rules fairly and faithfully. If we look at the 
acquis or the Copenhagen criteria, corruption is characterized by a relatively low level of outside 
incentives. Thus, one can legitimately expect only modest improvements in corruption levels 
during the candidacy period and perhaps backsliding after accession when EU leverage 
diminishes.  
Such skepticism would in a way be justified. Some academics have already identified 
areas where the impact of EU conditionality has not been not as lasting. Mungiu-Pippidi (2007) 
emphasizes that challenges like populism and nationalism unfortunately do not end with 
accession and are likely to continue playing an important role in the domestic political arenas of 
CEE. Rupnik (2007) also notes a populist backlash against accession in much of the region, 
though he admits that this effect is not likely to persist over time. Sasse (2008) finds that there 
are still on-going practical problems with the application of minority rights rules, despite some 
demonstrated formal legal compliance. Finally, Vachudova (2008) shows that although political 
parties moderated their agendas to bring them more in line with the EU during the candidacy 
period, parameters of competition broadened again post-accession as party programs became 
increasingly more nationalist and culturally conservative. Thus, lack of compliance in difficult 
areas and backsliding do not constitute exceptional circumstances.  
Nevertheless, I demonstrate that as far as corruption is concerned, compliance has largely 
been maintained and positive gains have not been negated after accession. Thus, I agree with 
Pop-Eleches and Levitz (2010) who show that EU leverage in new EU members was very strong 
and they have experienced at most a slowdown in reforms after accession, rather than genuine 
backsliding. There are three ways in which I build on Pop-Eleches and Levitz’s argument. First, I 
90 
 
focus specifically on the area of corruption, choosing the control variables for the statistical 
analysis accordingly. Second, I examine the mechanisms through which EU conditionality may 
have influenced corruption in CEE in more detail. Finally, the statistical analysis covers all 
countries of the world for which data are available, allowing for greater flexibility in the choice 
of reference groups.  
As stated earlier, the results demonstrate evidence for the positive impact of both EU 
candidacy and membership on corruption levels in CEE. In this way this article situates itself in 
the growing body of literature on issues where compliance endured after membership. For 
example, my findings fall in line with Sedelmeier’s (2008) evidence for the continuation of 
implementation of ЕU law among the newest members of the Union. He even argues that 
compliance after accession was in fact stronger in the new members than in the old ones. Trauner 
(2009) reinforces these arguments by showing that even in Bulgaria and Romania formal 
compliance with EU law has continued after accession. Epstein (2008) also adds to this 
“positivist” literature by delineating patterns of increasing openness to foreign direct investment 
in the banking sectors of these countries. Finally, Falkner and Treib (2008) explore the pattern of 
non-compliance with EU law in the CEE member states and find that it is actually similar to that 
of some existing members. This suggests that there is no evidence for a sui generis reaction to 
any pre-accession overstretch.  
 
Theoretical Framework and Hypotheses 
In this section I outline the theoretical background behind my hypotheses. First, I explain 
why EU leverage was so powerful during the pre-accession process and why it allowed the EU to 
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push for reforms that went beyond the formal scope of the negotiation chapters. In this context I 
formulate my first hypothesis about decreasing corruption levels in the pre-accession period. 
Second, I delineate the alternative mechanisms that have continued the pressure for reform post-
accession, when leverage was substantially decreased. These mechanisms serve as the basis of 
my second hypothesis about the lack of backsliding in corruption levels after accession.  
In the case of the Eastern Enlargement EU leverage was very powerful during the pre-
accession process because the benefits of membership and the costs of exclusion created huge 
incentives for candidates to try to fully satisfy all formal requirements  (Grabbe, 2006; 
Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005; Vachudova, 2005, Pridham, 2005).  In fact these benefits 
and costs were so great that post-communist elites were willing to do more than simply close the 
negotiation chapters – they were willing to address general institutional and political 
shortcomings, otherwise highlighted by the EU. Although some scholars have argued that the 
power of EU conditionality would be the weakest in areas where the EU never applied specific 
conditionality (such as rules that are neither part of the acquis, nor of the Copenhagen criteria), 
the issue of corruption always received a high level of visibility from the Commission’s Regular 
Reports and domestic elites knew it was critical to try to curb it during the pre-accession period. 
Thus, in light of the significant power of EU leverage during the accession period and the high 
visibility of the issue of corruption in these countries, I propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Corruption levels decrease during the entire candidacy period. 
As stated earlier, many authors have made the case that backsliding is likely to occur in 
the post-accession period due to the decrease of leverage after the ultimate reward of 
membership has been granted. There are three mechanisms, however, that compensate for this 
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loss of leverage in this period and suggest that corruption levels may actually continue to 
improve. As Levitz and Pop-Eleches argue, EU leverage, though transformed, remained an 
important force after membership (Levitz and Pop-Eleches, 2010). Greater dependence on trade 
and especially the potential threat of freezing the massive Structural and Cohesion funds 
available to new poorer members acted as a powerful incentive for elites to stay on the reform 
path. Additionally, greater linkage and exposure to the West for both elites and citizens was 
associated with higher expectations of government performance and served as an additional 
pressure to continue compliance. Finally, spillover effects associated with the gradual removal of 
the state from the economy, improvements in the legal system and strengthened regulatory 
institutions also contributed to fewer opportunities for corrupt behavior in the political realm.  
Thus, in light of these arguments I propose the following hypothesis related to the post-
accession period: 
H2: There is no backsliding in corruption control after accession 
 
Methodological Framework 
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, I outline the way the dependent variable, 
levels of corruption, the independent variables of interest, EU Candidacy Process and Full 
Membership, and all the relevant control variables have been operationalized. Then, I present the 
findings of the statistical analysis and explain the meaning of these results for my hypotheses.  
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Operationalization of the dependent variable - Corruption 
         
 In order to specify the dependent variable, corruption, I refer to the Control of Corruption 
(CC) index, which is part of the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI). Kaufmann, 
Kraay, and Mastruzzi (KKM), who have developed the index, define CC as an index “measuring 
perceptions of the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty 
and grand forms of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests.”16. 
The index covers 212 countries and territories for the years 1996, 1998, 2000, and 2002-2007.  
The scores for the years 1997, 1999, and 2001 are manually constructed by averaging the 
adjoining years.  
The CC index is based on a number of individual variables measuring perceptions of 
corruption, representing 35 separate data sources produced by 32 different organizations from 
around the world.
17
 Importantly, all WGI indicators are based on subjective or perceptions-based 
data on governance reflecting the perspectives of a wide range of informed stakeholders 
including thousands of private individual and firm survey respondents, experts working for the 
private sector, NGOs, and public sector agencies. The aggregation technique KKM use is an 
unobserved components model which allows for the extraction of the common component of the 
multiple corruption measures and thereby assigns a single, annual corruption score to every 
country in the world. The main advantage of this approach is that the aggregate indicators are 
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 http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#faq (accessed on August 11, 2014). 
 
17
 Since the number of data sources varies from year to year, critics of the CC have made the case that comparisons 
across time are inconsistent and should not be done. However, KKM have argued that since the measure is 
constructed for the entire dataset at the same time, levels of corruption at different time points can be considered 
methodologically comparable.  
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more informative about unobserved governance than any individual data source. The aggregate 
corruption scores are then scaled to follow a normal distribution with a mean of zero and a 
standard deviation of one in each period. This means that virtually all scores lie between -2.5 and 
2.5, with higher scores corresponding to better outcomes. The measure is constructed for the 
entire dataset at the same time, so that levels of corruption at different time points can be 
considered comparable. The dependent variable in this study is defined as the annual level of a 
country’s aggregate Control of Corruption score, as calculated from the publicly available 
dataset provided by the World Bank.   
The CC is one of the most popular indexes measuring corruption. This is not surprising 
given its indisputable advantages – broader country coverage than any individual data source on 
corruption and a systematic aggregation of corruption data from over 30 different data sources. 
Nevertheless, the CC is often criticized for the fact that the index is based on subjective 
perception-based data and not on objective measures of corruption. KKM defend the 
appropriateness of CC pointing out at several considerations.  
First of all, perceptions do matter immensely because political and economic actors often 
base their actions on their perceptions, impressions, and views. Thus, if citizens, for example, 
believe that the courts are ineffective or the police are corrupt, they are likely to downplay their 
importance as institutions and avoid their services. Furthermore, if investors believe that the 
investment climate in a given country is inappropriate, they will withdraw their investments even 
if the fundamentals of the national economy look good on paper. Secondly, as far as corruption is 
concerned, there are few alternatives to relying on perceptions data since by definition corruption 
leaves no ‘paper trail’ that can be captured objectively. Thirdly, KKM point that potential 
problems with expert assessments, such as, that such assessments can sometimes be tainted by 
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ideological biases, or be biased towards the views of the business elite or by the recent economic 
performance of the countries in question (i.e. so called 'halo effects') are tested for empirically 
and proven to be statistically insignificant. Last, even when fact-based data are actually 
available, the de jure notion of national laws may differ substantially from the de facto reality 
that exists on the ground. Relatedly, the legal systems of different countries often define 
instances of corruption differently, so a measure that may seem objective, such as relative share 
of verdicts for cases of corruption, may actually be highly inconsistent across countries. 
A potential weakness of the CC index is that it measures the public’s general perception 
about corruption, which renders measuring different aspects or forms of corruption (nepotism, 
bribery, extortion etc) impossible (Heidenheimer 2005). Nevertheless, for the purpose of this 
study the CC’s advantages outweigh its shortcomings. It’s broad geographical coverage and the 
systematic aggregation of data from a variety of sources allows for effective cross-country 
comparisons of overall corruption trends over time.  
An alternative measure that some studies have employed is the Transparency 
International’s Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI), which uses a similar methodological 
approach to produce its aggregate scores. There are two disadvantages of this index compared to 
the CC. First, it covers fewer countries and second it uses fewer sources to produce its aggregate 
scores. That said, I did run a correlation analysis to test for the level of overlap between the CPI 
and the CC in my sample and the high correlation coefficient of .972 indicated that the two 
indexes can basically be used interchangeably.  
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Operationalization of the independent variables - EU Candidacy Process and Full Membership
18
  
 The two independent variables of interest in this study are EU candidacy process and EU 
membership. EU candidacy process is defined as the period between the moment when a country 
has signed an association agreement with the EU (but has not yet entered accession negotiations) 
and the moment when full membership is achieved. Although the EU candidacy process goes 
through several stages starting with more general rather than specific conditionality and then 
moving to actively transposing the full acquis communautaire during the negotiations phase, 
looking at the process as a whole is a sensible approach given that both the softer inactive 
leverage of the initial phase and the active leverage of the negotiations phase exert powerful 
influence on acceding members. Per hypothesis 1, I expect a strong improvement in corruption 
levels during the Candidacy Process.  
 
Table 1: Independent Variable – EU Candidacy Process 
Status Country and Period 
EU Candidacy Process 
Bulgaria 1996-2006, Czech Republic 1996-
2003, Estonia 1996-2003, Hungary 1996-2003, 
Latvia 1996-2003, Lithuania 1996-2003, 
Poland 1996-2003, Romania 1996-2006, 
Slovakia 1996-2003, Slovenia 1996-2003 
 
                                                          
18
 A number of studies (Gray 2009; Pop-Elecech and Levitz,  2010) use time period dummies to operatlionlize the 
effects of EU conditionality on various policy areas. Importantly, there were also other external actors that exercised 
pressure for reform in these time periods, so disentangling the unique EU effects is difficult. Nevertheless, it is 
believed that the EU’s conditionality constituted the most powerful influence after the mid-1990s (most WB and 
IMF programs, for example, aimed at reforms trying to achieve greater macroeconomic stability and the OECD 
Anti-bribery Convention (1999) focused on a specific component of corruption. The consistency and scale of 
treatment that the EU Regular Reports provided was more comprehensive.  
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 The second independent variable, EU membership, is defined as the moment when all the 
existing member states have ratified the Treaty of Accession and a country has become a full-
fledged member of the Union. Importantly, at that point, the EU can no longer threaten to 
withhold membership in order to compel a country to comply with its demands, though it can use 
other types of leverage such as threatening to stop or stopping Structural and Cohesion Funds to 
new members. This considerable decrease of leverage after full membership is granted is 
interpreted by many as the main reason why new members may experience backsliding. 
Therefore, looking at corruption levels post accession is also extremely important for this study 
since it will show whether potential gains made during the candidacy process are sustainable. Per 
hypothesis 2, I expect that the improvement in corruption levels achieved during the candidacy 
period will be sustained in the post-enlargement period.  
 
Table 2: Independent variable – Full Membership 
Status Country and Period 
Full Membership 
Bulgaria 2007-09, Czech Republic 2004-09, 
Estonia 2004-09, Hungary 2004-09, Latvia 
2004-09, Lithuania 2004-09, Poland 2004-09, 
Romania 2007-09, Slovakia 2004-09, Slovenia 
2004-09 
 
 In the two regressions that follow I assign dummies to CEE candidate countries in 
accordance with the time periods outlined above. For the first independent variable, EU 
accession process, a country receives a 1 if in any given year it is at any stage of the EU 
candidacy process (if it has signed an association agreement with the EU, is conducting 
accession negotiations, or has signed a Treaty of Accession). For years that the country is not 
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part of the process it receives a 0. For the second independent variable, full membership, a 
country receives a 1 for any year in which it is a full member of the Union. Conversely, for years 
preceding the year of accession it receives a 0. There are no overlapping years and the eight post-
communist countries who joined in May 2004 receive a 1 for the entire 2004.  
 
Control Variables and Alternative Explanations 
 In order to isolate the effects of the EU candidacy process and EU membership I refer to 
the academic literature on corruption to identify factors affecting corruption levels. Thus, the 
control variables included in the statistical analysis are: size of the public sector (government 
expenditure), level of economic development (GDP), level of economic competition (ratio of 
imports to GDP), level of democracy (Freedom in the World - average of political rights and 
civil liberties scores), freedom of the press, abundance of natural resources, neighboring and 
diffusion effects, and civil society.  
 
Government Spending (General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of 
GDP; United Nations Statistical Division) 
Several studies, including LaPalombara (1994), Rijckeghem and Weber (1997), Elliott 
(1997), employ this measure and argue that the incidence of corruption may be related to the size 
of the public sector. Intuitively, a system entailing more frequent and extensive intervention of 
the state in the economy may introduce more opportunities for corruption.  
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Level of Economic Development (Log of GDP per capita; Economist Intelligence Unit, World 
Development Indicators) 
Studies by Kaufman et al (1999), Poirson (1998) and Leite & Weidmann (1999), 
Sandholtz and Gray (2003), and Dearden (2000) have all confirmed the significance of economic 
growth for corruption levels. Although the causal story varies somewhat among low, middle and 
high-income countries, the effects of economic growth on corruption are unquestionable and it 
therefore seems appropriate to include the log of GDP per capita as a proxy for level of 
economic development in a given country. 
 
Competition (Imports as a percentage of GDP; United Nations Statistical Division) 
The intuition is that opportunities for corruption may increase due to the lack of 
competition in a national economy. This means that theoretically, more open economies must be 
less corrupt. Gerring and Thacker (2005) and Ades and Di Tella (1999) prove this correlation 
empirically by examining the precise relationship between trade openness and levels of political 
corruption. That is why using imports as a percentage of GDP (like Ades and Di Tella) to 
account for the level of competition in a national economy seems like a sensible choice. 
 
Level of Democracy (Freedom in the World: average of political rights and civil liberties scores; 
Freedom House)  
Montinola and Jackman (2002) present convincing evidence that democratic practices 
inhibit corruption especially after a threshold of democratic consolidation is passed. Boerzel, 
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Stahn, and Pamuk (forthcoming) show that the level of corruption in the Eastern Europe is 
strongly connected to the success of democratic and economic reforms. Thus, I include the 
Freedom in the World index as a proxy for level of democracy.  
 
Freedom of the Press (Freedom House) 
Many scholars argue that the media may serve as a powerful check on corruption.  
Karklins (2005) finds that the media has proven to be one of the most effective promoters of 
anti-corrupt politics. Freille et al. (2005), in a 10-year panel study, find that restrictions on press 
freedom lead to higher levels of corruption. Holmes (2006) provides survey evidence on the 
effects of the media on public perceptions of corruption in Bulgaria, Hungary, Poland, Russia, 
and China and concludes that the media in these countries cover corruption extensively, provide 
most of the knowledge that the public has of corruption, and therefore heavily influences the 
public's perception of corruption in state institutions. 
 
Abundance of Natural Resources (Production of minerals and utilities as a percentage of GDP; 
United Nations Statistical Division) 
 The intuition behind this variable is that abundance of natural resources may create 
opportunities for rent seeking and thus facilitate corrupt behavior. Leite and Weidemann (1999), 
Ades and Di Tella (1999), and Ross (2008) review such arguments and prove their statistical 
significance.  For the purposes of this study I will use production of fuels and minerals as a share 
of GNP to proxy for abundance of natural resources. 
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Neighborhood and Diffusion Effects (Average corruption score of neighboring countries, as 
calculated from the World Bank’s Control of Corruption index) 
 Controlling for neighborhood and diffusion effects is also a very good idea. Sandholtz 
and Gray (2003) argue that international interactions can affect norms and practices that one may 
think were determined by social and local factors. They focus specifically on corruption and 
show that corruption tends increase in countries surrounded by corrupt neighbors. Similar 
regional diffusion effects are also extensively explored in the international political economy 
literature by Simmons et all (2008).  
 
Civil Society (Freedom House Nations in Transit) 
 Karklins (2005) makes the case that a strong a pluralist civil society can act as a barrier to 
corruption and that this is particularly the case in Eastern Europe. She looks at several examples 
(e.g. Lithuania, Bulgaria) and shows how the incorporation of nongovernmental organizations in 
anti-corruption programs made them more effective. Thus, I include the Freedom House Nations 
in Transit index for civil society in Eastern Europe as a proxy for the strength of the sector.
19
  
 
Statistical Analysis and Results 
Table 3 below presents the results of the time-series cross-sectional analyses utilizing a 
Fixed Effects Regression Model (FE). Fixed effects are particularly appropriate in studies like 
                                                          
19
 Due to data availability issues and the explicit theoretical relevance of this variable for Eastern Europe, I include it 
only in my third regression, where the sample includes only Eastern European states.  
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this, where unobservable country-specific characteristics and historical differences may affect 
the dependent variable in ways that the control variables by themselves cannot account for.  
The table includes three models (Model 1, Model 2 and Model 3), the difference between 
which is the choice of the reference group – all countries from around the world in Model 1, the 
27 EU countries in Model 2, and only the post-communist countries in Model 3.  
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Table 3:  The Effects of EU Candidacy and Membership on Corruption Levels 
Drivers Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
EU Candidacy process 
.089** 
(.056) 
.173*** 
(.052) 
.112 *** 
(.055)     
Full Membership 
.116** 
(.064) 
.189*** 
(.063) 
.106*  
(.065)     
Level of Economic 
Development 
.156** 
(.077)     
.406* 
(.248) 
.451*** 
(.137)  
Neighbors’ corruption .093***   
(.033)   
.007 
(.101)   
.033 
(.094)     
Size of the Public sector .438*** 
(.162)      
-1.83*** 
(.586)      
.009** 
(.004)     
Competition -.062 
(.051)     
-.126 
(.169)     
-.000 
(.001)      
Natural resources -.421*** 
(.122)      
-.196 
(1.66)      
-.003 
(.003)    
Level of democracy (“Freedom 
in the World” score) 
-.068*** 
(.009)    
.015 
(.031)    
.090*** 
(.023)    
Freedom of the press -.221*** 
(.073)  
-.439** 
(.196)  
-.002* 
(.001)  
Civil Society .. .. -.068** 
(.031) 
Constant -.289 
(.292) 
-.372 
(1.03) 
-1.71*** 
(.531) 
R-squared 0.63 0.26 0.83 
Number of Observations 1898 319 330 
Standard errors in parentheses. Significant at: * 10%; ** 5%; *** 1%. One-tailed tests where 
appropriate. 
 
In Model 1 the reference group to which post-communist candidate states are compared 
consists of the entire set of non-candidate countries. Here I test whether a country’s inclusion in 
the EU candidacy process improves corruption levels in any way. Per Hypotheses 1 I expect that 
corruption declines while a country is part of the accession process. Per hypothesis 2 I expect 
that this trend remains unchanged after membership is attained.  
The results of this analysis confirm both hypotheses. Relative to the base of non-
candidate countries from around the world, CEE countries performed strongly, on average, 
(positive coefficient of .089) during the EU candidacy process. After accession, the candidate 
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states did not experience backsliding (positive coefficient of .116). Thus, based on this analysis I 
can infer that the progress made during the accession process led to sound and sustainable results 
that continued to be present in the post-membership period.  Six of the control variables, Level of 
Economic Development, Neighboring Corruption, Size of the Public Sector, Natural Resources, 
Level of Democracy, and Freedom of the Press were also found to be significant drivers of 
corruption levels. Although they are of no particular interest in the present study, these control 
variables have signs and levels of statistical significance broadly consistent with theory and prior 
studies. Incidentally, the negative coefficient on the freedom of the press variable is to be 
expected, since in this particular Freedom House assessment, higher scores correspond to less 
freedom. This is important because it also provides evidence to the claim that the high visibility 
of the issue of corruption created by the media allowed EU leverage to work even in this area 
which was not explicitly emphasized in the acquis or the Copenhagen criteria. The findings 
confirm the hypotheses that during the accession process corruption levels fall and that there is 
no backsliding even after membership has been obtained.  
In Model 2 the reference group to which post-communist candidate states are compared 
consists of the other EU members. The results of this analysis also confirm both hypotheses. 
Relative to the base of old EU members, CEE countries performed strongly (positive coefficient 
of .173) and statistically significantly (p-value: 0.001) both during the EU candidacy process and 
after they attained membership (positive coefficient of .189 and p-value: 0.003). However, one 
has to be cautious with the interpretation of these results since old EU members had considerably 
lower levels of corruption to start with (hence less room and opportunities to improve). That is 
why it is not surprising that the CEE countries outperformed this base. Nevertheless, the results 
of this regression are important since they demonstrate that CEE countries are firmly set on a 
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positive trajectory in their fight against corruption and are trying to catch up with their more 
developed and less corrupt Western European counterparts. Three of the control variables, Level 
of Economic Development, Size of the Public Sector, and Freedom of the Press were also found 
to be significant drivers of corruption levels.  
Model 3 restricts the sample to the candidate countries plus the non-candidate post-
communist states of the former Soviet bloc. The inclusion of this reference group serves a 
specific methodological goal – to separate the effect of the EU’s incentive-based approach from 
the set of potential domestic issues associated with the post-communist transition period that all 
these countries were part of. The results of Model 3 are broadly consistent with the results of the 
previous two. Relative to the reference group of post-communist non-candidate states, candidate 
countries performed better both during the EU candidacy process and after membership, 
although the positive coefficient for the post-membership dummy is significant only at the 10 
percent level. The lower significance level and the smaller coefficient here suggest an interesting 
dynamic. We cannot be as confident about the post-communist members’ progress in corruption 
control when comparing them to their other post-communist peers. While these results refute a 
possible argument for backsliding, they provide some credence to the claim that as far as 
corruption is concerned there may be a slowdown in reform in the post-membership period. Five 
of the control variables, Level of Economic Development, Size of the Public Sector, Levels of 
Democracy, Freedom of the Press, and Civil Society were also found to be significant drivers of 
corruption levels. Thus, the findings of Model 3 also confirm both the hypotheses that before 
accession corruption would be falling and no backsliding will occur after membership but also 
suggest that there may be evidence of a slowdown in reform.  
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Causal Mechanisms 
The purpose of this section is to trace the causal mechanisms through which the EU was 
able to influence the fight against corruption before and after accession. The question of pre-
accession leverage is an important one since it both set the tone for the negotiations and 
delineated the set of expectations after membership was granted. In this period the Commission 
Regular Reports included detailed demands to fight corruption as well as recommendations on 
how this should be done. Responsiveness to these demands and recommendations was explicitly 
tied to a candidate’s chances for membership. The more interesting question, however, is what 
mechanisms have prevented potential backsliding after accession when EU leverage became 
weaker. I argue that there are three mechanisms in play that compensate for the presumed loss of 
leverage after membership: continued leverage (Structural and Cohesion Funds and CVM 
reports), increased linkage (socialization effects), and spillover effects from other parts of the 
acquis (reduction of the role of the state in the economy and improvements in the legal system). 
While the first two have already been discussed in the literature, the third has yet not been 
addressed.  
Focusing first on the period before accession, although not part of the acquis or the 
Copenhagen criteria, corruption became a recurrent theme in the Commission Regular Reports, 
which were becoming more detailed and specific as accession was approaching. This was partly 
due to the candidates’ desire for more explicit targets and for assurances that they are meeting all 
membership criteria (Grabbe, 2006). By the early 2000s specific and detailed recommendations 
for anti-corruption measures had replaced the vague and formalistic statements of the earliest 
reports (Hughes, Sasse, Gordon, 2004). In fact, corruption had become such a salient issue that 
the EU built into Bulgaria and Romania’s accession treaty a safeguard clause (Article 39) 
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allowing for a delay of accession by one year in the event of insufficient progress in tackling 
corruption. Importantly, such strictness was not confined only to these more corrupt countries. 
The EU consistently noted the prevalence of corruption in Hungary and identified public 
procurement as an area of concern in both the 1999 and 2000 Regular Reports. The situation was 
similar in the 1999 Regular Report on Latvia and in the 2002 Regular Report on Poland asserting 
that corruption “threatens to undermine the functioning of many public spheres” (Regular 
Report, 2002). This is just a sample of several reports, but corruption was a central issue in 
many. Furthermore, the issuance of every report was followed by enormous publicity in the 
media, thus forging a significant level of domestic pressure for compliance as well. Thus, since 
corruption was clearly a highly visible and salient issue, EU leverage was substantial.  In other 
words, the incentives for candidates to decrease levels of corruption during the accession period 
were high since this decrease was directly tied to their prospects of qualifying for membership. 
After accession continued leverage, increased linkage and spillover effects resulting from 
the implementation of other parts of the acquis compensated for the diminished leverage of the 
EU. First of all, new members became eligible for significant amounts of Structural and 
Cohesion Funds (S&C) (about one-third of the EU budget). These members’ dependence on 
conditional EU funding (which could be cut off in cases of non-compliance as it happened in 
Bulgaria), therefore, continued to promote governance reforms. Furthermore, in the cases of 
Bulgaria and Romania a Cooperation and Verification Mechanism (CVM) was instituted to 
ensure that both countries comply with their commitments. Progress in fighting corruption was 
always a special focus in these reports. To elaborate on how the leverage of S&C funds translates 
into pressure for reform, I will now turn to a brief case-specific discussion of Bulgaria and 
Romania.  
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In response to a corruption scandal in Bulgaria with two officials of the National Road 
Agency in January 2008, the Commission exercised its post-accession leverage by cutting off 
funding for road construction. Importantly, the investigation was initiated by a scathing article in 
Bulgaria’s leading business newspaper, Kapital. In February and March the Commission froze 
PHARE and SAPARD funding in light of more corruption allegations in the ministries of finance 
and regional development. As a result of its failure to address its looming corruption, Bulgaria 
ended up with two ministerial resignations, an irreversible loss of 220 and a freezing of 340 
million Euros.  
Although the 340 million were later on unfrozen, Bulgarian authorities, and most 
specifically the new Prime Minister Boiko Borissov realized that the time to “wage a full-scale 
war” on corruption had arrived. In early 2010 during operation “Octopus” (“Октопод”) the 
government was able to expose and arrest high ranking public officials (associated with the State 
Agency for National Security with jurisdictions to fight corruption) involved in money 
laundering, tax evasion and siphoning money from a now-defunct steelmaker, among other 
allegations (Liubomirska, 2010). A few months earlier during the operation “Impudence” 
(“Наглите”) the Borissov government was able to deal a major blow against organized crime by 
arresting a number of mafia members involved in kidnappings, contract killings, and trafficking.  
In 2007 the Commission threatened to freeze agricultural funds to Romania unless the 
country filled some corruption-inducing gaps in its payments system. Reforms were quickly 
implemented and allegations of corruption led to the resignation of Romania’s justice minister 
Tudor Chiuariu two months later (Ivanov forthcoming). All these developments where closely 
and extensively covered by a series of EU monitoring reports and the media, which criticized 
Bulgaria and Romania and called for more intense efforts to curb corruption (CVM Reports June 
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2007; February 2008; July 2008). Even so, one should note that corruption control in Bulgaria 
and Romania has only slightly improved in the post-accession period and basically remained 
steady. This suggests that continued EU leverage in the form of conditional funding and CVMs  
may at best be considered as an effective containment strategy.  
 
Figure 2: Corruption in Bulgaria 1997-2011 
 
Source: Control of Corruption Index 1997-2011, World Bank. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc (accessed on July 17, 2014). 
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Figure 2.1: Corruption in Romania 1997-2011 
 
Source: Control of Corruption Index 1997-2011, World Bank. Available at: 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc (accessed on July 17, 2014). 
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p.806). He argues that extended linkages with the West could have made CEE citizens more 
sensitive about public shaming and more demanding as far as compliance goes through a process 
of socialization. Levitz and Pop-Eleches add to this argument by empirically showing that East 
Europeans working and traveling abroad are steadily turning into an electorate with higher 
expectations about the rule of law and corruption standards, thus exerting an important positive 
impact on the political culture in their home countries.  
The third mechanism explaining the lack of backsliding in corruption levels after 
accession can be attributed to spillover effects from the gradual removal of the state from the 
economy, from stricter and more effective regulatory institutions, and from improvements in the 
legal system as a result of the implementation of the acquis. Using descriptive statistics from the 
World Bank, I show that the governments in the 10 post-communist countries that joined the EU 
in 2004 and 2007 have decreased their spending as a percentage of GDP, have encouraged 
privatization and the growth of the private sector, and have improved the quality of the civil 
service, the police and the courts. All these developments either limit opportunities for 
corruption or make it easier for state institutions to combat it more effectively.  
In all of the figures that follow, the ten post-communist countries that are depicted are: 
Bulgaria, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Romania, Slovakia, 
and Slovenia. Figure 3 pertains to the diminishing role of the state in the economy and figures 4 
and 5 pertain to the evolution of more effective regulatory institutions and an improved legal 
system. 
112 
 
Figure 3 below shows a constant improvement in the ability of the government to 
formulate and implement policies and regulations that permit and promote private sector 
development since the early 2000s.  
 
Figure 3: Government Promotion of Private Sector Development 
 
Source: World Government Indicators (WGI) 1998-2010, World Bank. Available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed on July 17, 2014). 
 
Figure 3 suggests that the role of the state in the economy has undergone a considerable 
reduction since the early 2000s. This conclusion is not surprising given the EU’s emphasis on the 
privatization of state owned enterprises, the reduction of price regulation, and the decrease of 
subsidies. These policy prescriptions followed from the criticisms included in the Regular 
Reports produced by the Commission and also reflect specific targets and objectives from 
several of the chapters of the acquis. Chapter 6, Competition Policy, covers both anti-trust and 
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companies and to prevent governments from granting state aid which distorts competition in the 
internal market. Related to this, Chapter 11, Economic and Monetary Policy, contains specific 
rules prohibiting privileged access of the public sector to financial institutions. Finally, chapters 
15, Industrial Policy, and 16, Small and Medium-sized Enterprises, promote privatization and 
industrial strategies enhancing internal and external competitiveness. Thus, given that the 
implementation of these chapters preceded, for the most part, the periods when we observe less 
state subsidies and better promotion of private sector development, it is likely that it was 
precisely the development of these EU-driven institutional capacities that played a key role in 
generating the observed outcomes. 
Figure 4 below shows an improving trend in the quality of public and civil services and 
the degree of their independence from political pressures as well as the quality of policy 
formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government’s commitment to such 
policies since the mid-1990s. A brief reversal of the trend occurs after the 2007 enlargement but 
its positive trajectory is restored the following year.  
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Figure 4: Quality of Public and Civil Service 
 
Source: World Government Indicators (WGI) 1998-2010, World Bank. Available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed on July 17, 2014). 
 
Figure 5 below also shows an improving trend in the level of confidence that societal 
actors have in the quality of the police and the courts. The trend becomes even more pronounced 
after the 2007 enlargement. 
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Figure 5: Quality of the Police and the Courts 
 
Source: World Government Indicators (WGI) 1998-2010, World Bank. Available at 
http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.asp (accessed on July 17, 2014). 
 
Focusing on government effectiveness and the quality of civil and public service, the 
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improvements in civil and public services and in the judiciary can be attributed to the 
implementation of the acquis.  
To sum up, before accession, CEE leaders had strong incentives to try to curb corruption 
since it was a highly salient issue specifically emphasized in the Commission Regular Reports. 
The asymmetric power relationship between the EU and the candidate members allowed the EU 
to effectively use its leverage to induce change even in areas that were not formally in the acquis 
or the Copenhagen criteria, such as corruption. After accession, the relative loss of leverage was 
compensated by three mechanisms which sustained the pressure for reform and prevented 
backsliding: continued leverage (Structural and Cohesion Funds and CVM reports), increased 
linkage (socialization effects), and spillover effects (reduction of the role of the state in the 
economy and improvements in the legal system) from implementing the acquis in other areas.  
 
Conclusion  
This article’s contributions to the larger literature on corruption in post-communist 
societies fall in two substantive areas: establishing a causal link between EU candidacy and 
corruption levels and exploring the mechanisms through which corruption challenges are 
addressed. Regarding the first, this study empirically demonstrates that EU candidacy has a 
unique and positive impact on corruption levels in acceding members. Although corruption was 
neither part of the acquis nor of the Copenhagen criteria, it was an issue that received a lot of 
visibility in the CEE countries during the accession period through the Commission Regular 
Reports. Taking advantage of its leverage, the EU was able to demand reforms going beyond the 
scope of the acquis that served to curb corruption levels during this time. Importantly, as 
117 
 
demonstrated by the time series analyses, absolute gains in the fight against corruption were not 
negated after accession (though there may be evidence for a slowdown). These findings support 
the arguments against backsliding (Pop- Eleches and Levitz 2010) and cast doubt on studies 
suggesting that lack of density of formal rules (Jacoby 2004) or lack of explicit conditionality 
(Epstein and Sedelmeier 2008) negatively affects the success of reforms.  
The second important contribution of this study is that it has identified and explored three 
causal mechanisms that compensated for the relative loss of leverage in the post-accession period 
and prevented backsliding. While the first two are already familiar in the literature, the third one, 
“acquis spillover,” is new and unique and is worthy of further exploration. The theory behind the 
three post-accession causal mechanisms goes as follows. First, the EU was able to continue to 
exert some leverage and thus sustain pressure for reform through the threat of cutting off 
conditional funding in cases of non-compliance. Having acted on this threat once, in the case of 
Bulgaria, the EU demonstrated that this was a real and credible punishment mechanism, which it 
can use if serious violations are uncovered. Second, increased linkages between Western and 
Eastern Europe, exemplified in the number of people traveling and working in the West, led to 
the gradual emergence of an electorate of more “europeanized” CEE citizens with higher 
expectations about the rule of law and corruption. Such socialization effects serve as the silent 
underpinnings of a new political culture, one that holds politicians to higher standards and 
demands good governance at all costs. As opinion polls have indicated, Central and Eastern 
Europeans are a lot more pro-EU than their Western European counterparts and are therefore 
unwilling to risk marginalization with respect to the EU for lack of compliance. Third, spillover 
effects associated with the reduction of the role of the state in the economy and improvements in 
the legal system and the strengthened effectiveness of regulatory institutions as a result of the 
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implementation of the acquis either limit opportunities for corruption or allow for more 
conducive conditions to tackle it. Further research is needed to flesh out the exact causality of 
these three mechanisms.  
Nevertheless, absolute improvements in corruption levels in CEE countries do not 
necessarily mean that a bright future is inevitable. These countries still remain much more 
corrupt than the Western European members and corruption continues to undermine economic 
progress and the citizens’ faith in the democratic system. That is why pressure for reform from 
the EU should persist, especially in the context of the potential slowdown or stasis in the post-
accession period.  
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APPENDIX A: Variable measurement and Descriptive Statistics  
Table A.1: Variable Measurement  
EU 
candidacy  
A country is assigned a 1 if it has signed an association agreement with the EU 
but not yet entered into accession negotiations; 0 otherwise. Source: Author. 
EU 
Membership 
A country is assigned a 1 if a it has become a full member of the Union; 0 
otherwise Source: Author. 
Corruption 
Control 
The Control of Corruption Index (one of the six World Governance Indicators 
(WGI)). The Control of Corruption Index is a composite governance indicator 
based on 32 underlying data sources.  These data sources are rescaled and 
combined to create an aggregate using an unobserved components model (UCM). 
The UCM assumes that the observed data from each source are a linear function 
of the unobserved level of governance, plus an error term.  This linear function is 
different for different data sources, and so corrects for the remaining non-
comparability of units of the rescaled data noted above.  The resulting estimates 
of governance are a weighted average of the data from each source, with weights 
reflecting the pattern of correlation among data sources.   The UCM assigns 
greater weight to data sources that tend to be more strongly correlated with each 
other.  While this weighting improves the statistical precision of the aggregate 
indicators, it typically does not affect very much the ranking of countries on the 
aggregate indicators.  The composite measures of corruption control generated by 
the UCM are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard 
deviation of one, and running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
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corresponding to better outcomes. The measure is useful as a tool for broad cross-
country comparisons and for evaluating broad trends over time. Source: World 
Bank: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, accessed in July 
2014.  
Level of 
Economic 
Development 
Log of GDP per capita. GDP is expressed in current U.S. dollars per person. Data 
are derived by first converting GDP in national currency to U.S. dollars and then 
dividing it by total population. Source: Economist Intelligence Unit, World 
Development Indicators. 
Competition Imports as a percentage of GDP. Source: United Nations Statistical Division 
Neighbor’s 
corruption 
Average corruption score of neighboring countries, as calculated from the World 
Bank’s Control of Corruption index. Source: Author. 
Level of 
Democracy 
Average of political rights and civil liberties scores in Freedom House's "Freedom 
in the World" report. Political rights enable people to participate freely in the 
political process, including the right to vote freely for distinct alternatives in 
legitimate elections, compete for public office, join political parties and 
organizations, and elect representatives who have a decisive impact on public 
policies and are accountable to the electorate. Civil liberties allow for the 
freedoms of expression and belief, associational and organizational rights, rule of 
law, and personal autonomy without interference from the state. Each country and 
territory is assigned a numerical rating—on a scale of 1 to 7—for political rights 
and an analogous rating for civil liberties; a rating of 1 indicates the highest 
124 
 
degree of freedom and 7 the lowest level of freedom.  Source: Freedom House: 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-world#.VKlrkivF93E,  
accessed in December 2014.   
Size of the 
Public Sector 
General government final consumption expenditure as a percentage of GDP. 
Source: United Nations Statistical Division. 
Freedom of 
the Press 
Score on Freedom House’s “Freedom of the Press” report. The Freedom of the 
Press index, an annual survey of media independence in 197 countries and 
territories, is at the core of Freedom House's press freedom project. The index 
assesses the degree of print, broadcast, and internet freedom in every country in 
the world, analyzing the events of each calendar year. It provides numerical 
rankings and rates each country's media as "Free," "Partly Free," or "Not Free”, so 
higher scores correspond to less freedom 
Source: Freedom House: https://www.freedomhouse.org/report-types/freedom-
press#.VKloGyvF93E, accessed in November 2014. 
Abundance 
of Natural 
Resources 
Production of minerals and utilities as a percentage of GDP Source: United 
Nations Statistical Division. 
Civil Society 
Weakness 
The Freedom House Civil Society Index. The index assesses the growth of 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), their organizational capacity and 
financial sustainability, and the legal and political environment in which they 
function; the development of free trade unions; and interest group participation in 
the policy process. The ratings are based on a scale of 1 to 7, with 1 representing 
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the highest and 7 the lowest level of civil society strength. They follow a quarter-
point scale. Minor to moderate developments typically warrant a positive or 
negative change of a quarter point (0.25), while significant developments warrant 
a half point (0.50). It is rare for any category to fluctuate more than a half point in 
a single year. Source: Freedom House: 
https://www.freedomhouse.org/report/nations-transit/nations-transit-
2014#.VJnSNF4Co, accessed in July 2014.  
 
Table A.2: Descriptive Statistics 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure/Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Corruption Control 2061 (0.05)                            0.99                             (2.09)                     2.60                                
EU candidacy 2088 0.06                             0.24                             -                         1.00                                
EU membership 2088 0.02                             0.14                             -                         1.00                                
Neghbor's corruption 2072 (0.12)                            0.79                             (1.59)                     2.36                                
Level of Economic Development 2088 3.69                             0.57                             2.16                       4.89                                
Size of the Public Sector 2088 0.17                             0.08                             0.03                       0.68                                
Natural Resources 2088 0.10                             0.14                             -                         0.88                                
Competition 2088 0.47                             0.25                             -                         2.16                                
Level of Democracy 2088 3.49                             1.94                             1.00                       7.00                                
Freedom of the Press 2088 0.47                             0.24                             0.05                       1.00                                
Civil Society Weakness 360 2.55                             0.77                             1.25                       7.00                                
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Chapter IV: Beneath the Veil of Hope: The effects of EU signaling on foreign investors’ 
sensitivity to corruption before and after EU membership 
 
The literature on the effects of corruption on Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) does not 
point to a conclusive causal logic. Some studies show that high corruption discourages FDI since 
it is perceived as an additional tax on doing business. Others suggest that it is irrelevant and other 
factors matter more. Still others argue that it can actually help FDI since it “greases the wheels” 
of the system. Looking at the relationship between corruption and FDI in the context of the 12 
countries (ten of them post-communist) which joined the EU in 2004-07 one can make a 
puzzling observation (Figure 1). During the pre-accession phase, despite the fact that corruption 
control was poor over long periods, FDI kept steadily increasing. Post-membership, however, 
deteriorating corruption control was punished by foreign investors and corruption and FDI were 
more closely correlated. Why did investors shift from disregarding it to being sensitive to it? In 
light of the established effect of EU signaling
20
 on investor confidence in Central and Eastern 
Europe (CEE) (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Gray, 2009), I hypothesize that (1) positive signaling 
during the pre-accession process trumped other important factors for FDI, such as corruption; (2) 
these factors then resurfaced after membership was granted (and signaling was over) and had the 
expected impact on investor confidence.
21
  
                                                          
20
 Positive, public announcements by the EU signifying the closing of accession chapters and the moving along the 
process towards full membership 
 
21
 The slowdown (or lack of growth) of FDI after accession is unlikely to be the result of saturation effects, the 
possibility that the majority of the opportunities are already captured and there in little more room for investment. 
For example, in spite of the large stock of FDI that has entered CEE to date, on a per capita basis this stock is in fact 
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Figure 1: Corruption Control and FDI in the 12 countries that joined the EU in 2004-07 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
not great when compared with other European nations or the EU’s average. Only Malta and Cyprus have FDI stock 
per capita that is higher than the EU’s average. For more information, see Appendix C (United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development).  
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Correlation coefficient before accession: 0.02. Correlation coefficient after accession 0.22. 
(World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development) 
 
I base this intuition on works on institutional signaling and cognitive psychology. Julia 
Gray (2009) shows that signaling alone, rather than real policy reform, can account for increased 
investor confidence when looking at spreads on sovereign debt. I use this argument and extend it 
by suggesting that (1) positive signaling can also mask slow (or insufficient) reform and (2) once 
signaling is over, investor guidebook consideration again become important for economic 
decision makers and they punish countries that lag behind or backslide. In other words, when 
signaling is gone, real performance matters. In constructing these arguments I also refer to the 
literature on how inferential shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, help people process 
complicated information and navigate uncertainty (e.g. as the one prevalent in information-
scarce environments like the non-OECD countries) (Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002). 
Despite its numerous practical uses, the availability heuristic may cause decision-makers to 
overestimate the significance of events that tend to be particularly memorable or vivid, such as a 
positive endorsement by a powerful international institution like the EU. This may in turn affect 
their risk-versus-reward calculus and make them less risk-averse.  
To test my hypotheses I use a mixed method approach. First, I run a time-series analysis 
covering data from 1996 to 2011 to establish that corruption did not have a significant impact on 
FDI before accession but did afterwards. Then, I present the results of an expert survey and a 
brief case study to demonstrate how signaling caused investors to be less risk-averse prior to EU 
membership by activating a specific psychological mechanisms, namely the availability 
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heuristic. There are two main contributions that I make to the literatures on international 
institutions, FDI, and corruption. First, I show that corruption matters for FDI differently in 
different contexts and while it has a clear negative effect when rational guidebook principles 
dominate decision-making, its significance could be muted by positive signaling by international 
institutions, such as the EU.  Second, I suggest that cognitive shortcuts, such as the availability 
heuristic, help explain foreign investor’s behavior when investors operate in information-scarce 
environments as they tend to assign disproportionate weight to signals perceived as legitimate. 
The rest of this article is organized as follows. First, I review the literatures on EU 
integration and FDI and corruption and FDI and explain how my arguments and findings 
contribute to both. Second, I outline the theoretical background informing my hypotheses. Third, 
I explain my methodological approach, discuss some of the difficulties associated with it, and 
present the results from the time series analysis, the survey, and the case study.  I end by 
summarizing my contributions to the academic literatures on FDI, EU signaling, and corruption 
 
EU accession, corruption, and FDI 
 By focusing on corruption and progress towards EU accession, this article contributes to 
the wide literature on the impact of EU integration on FDI flows. This section outlines the main 
findings in this literature and explains how my arguments fill some of the existing gaps.  
The positive effect of the EU on the quality of the investment climate in a country is 
well-established. Several studies have found that joining the EU has been beneficial for Western 
European countries attracting FDI. Similarly, others have explored the CEE countries and have 
established that the prospect of membership has led to increased FDI inflows. What the literature 
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on EU integration and FDI has not addressed so far is whether FDI flows to new member states 
continue to be influenced by the same drivers after accession as the ones that mattered before. 
Numerous challenges associated with the legacy of communism (corruption, state ownership, 
less stable banking sector) suggest that the dynamic in Eastern Europe, once EU leverage and 
signaling are gone, can make these countries more susceptible to regression or slowdown. If this 
is true, foreign investors in the region should have a higher threshold of fundamental 
justifications for their decisions after accession. No academic study so far has explored this 
possibility.  
This section outlines some of the key arguments and findings about the effects of 
European integration on FDI in Western Europe. After the foundation of the EU, a notable 
increase of intra- and inter-regional FDI flows was observed among the member countries. Barry 
(2002), for example, shows that Ireland has experienced a significant FDI boom after its EU 
accession in 1973. In this study he traces how a number of US-based MNCs have chosen Ireland 
as their starting point to expand in Europe. He further demonstrates that FDI has contributed to 
economic growth, better export sector performance, the reduction of unemployment, and the 
development of the high-tech sector. Similarly, Barrios (2002) investigates the effects of EU 
integration on the Spanish economy since its accession in 1986 and calls this story the “Spanish 
Economic Miracle”. He finds that the high FDI inflows resulting from the EU integration process 
have been responsible for the strong economic performance of the country. Galego (2002) makes 
a similar contribution to the literature showing that Austria, Finland and Sweden, who joined the 
EU in 1995, have since also became more attractive to foreign investors and are actually the 
main destination for FDI in the EU. Importantly, these studies are confined to the Western 
European context, explore only the effect of membership rather than the process of accession, 
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and claim that membership brings more FDI to new members. My study suggests that 
membership in the context of the 5
th
 enlargement may have actually raised the bar for FDI in 
CEE from the perspective of investors.  
Many authors have also researched the effects of the EU integration process on FDI flows 
into CEE candidate countries. While these are more directly related to the research question this 
study poses, they have focused mainly on the accession process, rather than to what happens 
after membership. Bevan and Estrin (2000), for example, specifically analyze the impact of the 
early accession process on FDI flows into the CEE countries and find out that the Essen Council 
announcement (1994) was associated with a significant increase of FDI received by the three 
most likely candidates for EU accession (Hungary, Poland, and the Czech Republic). Similarly, 
Claessens, Oks and Polastri (1998) examined capital flows to 21 transition countries over the 
1990s and determined that countries that applied for EU membership attracted more FDI. 
Finally, Kaminski (2001) compares FDI inflows between CEE countries and former Soviet 
republics and concludes that the possibility of and progression towards EU accession explains 
the high level of divergence in FDI inflows between these groups. Although these studies do not 
address the effect of EU membership on FDI in CEE, they clearly demonstrate that signaling 
during the accession period is key to FDI inflows. My study confirms this finding by focusing on 
a longer period (1996 to 2011), but also takes this a step further and argues that signaling may 
cause investors to temporarily discount other important factors through the availability heuristic.  
 Finally, my arguments also contribute to the literature on the effects of corruption on 
FDI. The level of corruption in the host country has been introduced as one factor among the 
determinants of FDI location since it is perceived as a source of uncertainty and an additional 
cost of doing business or a tax on profits (Al-Sadiq, 2009; Bardhan, 1997). Thus, countries with 
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lower corruption attract more per capita FDI (Abed and Davoodi, 2000). An array of other 
studies confirm this finding (Wei and Wu, 2001; Lambsdorff and Cornelius, 2000; and Wei, 
2000). Importantly, corruption also discourages FDI indirectly by adversely affecting other 
conditions that matter for investors. It has a negative effect on the level of investment and 
economic growth (Mauro, 1995), on the quality of infrastructure and productivity of public 
investment (Tanzi and Davoodi, 1997), on income inequality (Li, Xu and Zou, 2000), and on 
health care and education services (Gupta, Davoodi and Tiongson, 2000). All those factors affect 
investors' perceptions of stability and profitability, thus making them less likely to engage in FDI 
activity.  
Nevertheless, several studies fail to confirm the claim that corruption affects FDI 
negatively. Wheeler and Mody (1992) and Akcay (2001) find no evidence of a negative 
relationship between corruption and FDI. Wheeler and Mody combined corruption with 12 other 
indicators to form a latent variable and Akcay focused only on developing countries. Given these 
differences in their methodological approach, it is not surprising why their results were different. 
My study contributes to the debate on the effects of corruption on FDI, by introducing an 
argument as to when it may and when it may not matter, thus providing a more nuanced view to 
the question.  
There has been plenty of work on how the EU affects FDI levels for acceding members 
and how corruption affects FDI in general. However, no study has so far attempted to evaluate 
whether EU signaling can mute the effect of corruption temporarily, but then allow it to resurface 
as markets realize that the EU’s pre-accession process has not addressed the problem in a 
systemic way. It is this main argument that I contribute to the literatures on EU enlargement, FDI 
and corruption.  
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Theoretical Framework 
 This section explores the theory behind institutional signaling from which I derive my 
hypotheses about the differential effect of corruption on FDI before and after accession. It is 
organized in three parts. First, I briefly explain how joining an international institution increases 
investor confidence by reducing uncertainty. Then, I review some of the social and cognitive 
psychology literature on how signaling affects behavior and explain why certain signaling may 
sometimes lead to overconfidence. Third, I explain how the EU’s eastern enlargement is a 
particularly good test case for examining whether positive signaling can mute the importance of 
other factors, such as corruption.  
 A lot of the literature on international institutions claims that they can reduce uncertainty 
(Axelrod, 1981; Keohane, 1984; Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal, 2001; Morrow, 1994; North, 
1990). The main argument in these studies is that by imposing rules and requirements, 
international institutions regularize members' future behavior resulting in more predictable 
interactions between members. Similarly, institutions increase the costs of non-compliance as 
violations of commitments damage a country’s reputation and make further cooperation difficult 
or impossible (Abbott and Snidal, 2000, 427; Simmons, 2000, 594). Therefore, it will not be 
surprising if investors respond positively to positive signals regarding candidate countries' 
progress towards joining an institution like the EU. Moreover, EU conditionality covers an array 
of economic issues that can make the investment climate in these countries more stable and 
predictable, thus strengthening investor trust even more. In this way, good news about countries 
closing chapters and moving forward encourages investors. In their attempt to capture a first-
mover advantage and be ahead of the competition, they may then pay less attention to certain 
fundamentals (e.g. progress against corruption).  
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This is also consistent with a strand in the cognitive and social psychology literature 
(Kahneman, Slovic, and Tversky, 1982; Gilovich, Griffin, and Kahneman, 2002) which argues 
that actors rely on inferential shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, to streamline the 
processing of overabundant information and navigate uncertainty. The availability heuristic 
causes people to assign disproportionately higher weight to events that tend to be particularly 
striking or vivid, such as the positive signaling of a powerful international institution like the EU, 
and to overestimate their significance, especially if others are doing it too. The prominent 
example of this heuristic is how drivers react to seeing an accident. In this moment the inferential 
logic of bounded rationality activates, and they slow down. Based on limited but vivid data they 
exaggerate the statistical likelihood of crashing and conform to the appropriate speed limit. As 
time passes and no more car crashes are observed, the drivers’ comprehensive rationality kicks 
back in and provides a more accurate estimate of the probability of an accident, causing them to 
speed up again. Similarly, faced with a decision-theoretic problem, investors in the pre-accession 
stage assigned a greater (than warranted) weight to announcements by the EU which enjoyed 
high levels of publicity and perceived credibility. With positive signaling out of the picture in the 
post-accession period, the return of comprehensive rational analysis meant that investors would 
then once again pay due attention to all factors that should matter for their decisions (e.g. 
corruption).  
 At the same time, in information-scarce environments, such as non-OECD countries, 
markets pay special attention to events that can be “easily and uniformly interpreted,” visible 
acts, such as joining an international institution (Gray, 2009; Rodrik, 1989). Bordo and Rockoff 
(1996) argue that signing onto the gold standard in the nineteenth century served as an 
endorsement for developing countries. Moreover, the authors show that markets validated close 
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shadowing of the standard almost as much as actual adherence to it. This implies that policy 
change influenced investors less than nominal membership (Gray, 2009). Thus, one could 
speculate that it may have been possible for investors to be less concerned with actual reforms 
than with these countries' "progression" towards the risk-minimizing international institution.  
 Thinking about corruption in CEE, this may be especially relevant. None of the 31 
chapters of the acquis or the Copenhagen criteria focused explicitly on corruption and 
compliance tends to be the weakest in the areas where no explicit conditionality was applied 
(Epstein and Sedelmeier, 2008). Thus, corruption should have been an important factor for 
foreign investors both during the pre-accession process and after. Nevertheless, it is likely that, 
by the logic of the availability heuristic, they might have overlooked its importance, focusing 
instead on the positive signals from the EU allowing countries to advance in their negotiations.  
Julia Gray provides some background to this intuition. She finds that it was not actual policy 
reform that underpinned investor confidence in terms of spreads on sovereign debt, but merely 
positive signaling from the EU. Thus, while some of these countries were perhaps not 
accomplishing enough in terms of corruption control, this was compensated for by their moving 
further along the pre-accession process. Once membership was granted, real performance 
regained its relevance and centrality. There are, of course, many other factors that could account 
for this investor behavior. Lower labor costs before accession and rising wages after, the 
financial crisis of 2008, or lack of reform in other areas certainly also played a part in first 
encouraging and then discouraging investors after accession. My research design, however, 
controls for the independent effects of these factors and isolates the unique effect of corruption. 
 In terms of case selection, the 5
th
 enlargement is a particularly appropriate setting for 
examining the effect of institutional signaling on investor confidence. First, although these 
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countries had different levels of wealth and economic conditions in the 1990s, they all (except 
Cyprus and Malta) emerged from planned economies and needed to undertake a similar set of 
policy reforms around the same time (Pridham, 2005). Secondly, given that they all represented 
poorer and politically diverse countries, convinced of the economic necessity EU membership, 
the EU was able to exercise a stronger and more comprehensive conditionality on them as 
opposed to previous rounds (Vachudova, 2005) adding credibility to its signaling. Last, Brussels 
applied ex ante conditionality to the aspiring states and monitored their progress closely by 
publicly assessing their efforts (Vachudova, 2005). Thus, the eastern enlargement constitutes a 
convenient framework to test whether signaling can sometimes cause investors to discount 
otherwise important factors, such as corruption.  
 At the same time it is possible that it is exactly because of the “asymmetrical 
interdependence” between the CEE countries and the EU that EU signaling may have been 
perceived as more powerful than it would be in other contexts. There was hardly any aspect of 
public or private life that remained untouched during the conditionality period. Total overhaul is 
not easy in an environment of falling incomes, weak institutional capacity, and insufficient 
familiarity with modern practices. In such a difficult and all-encompassing effort, it was 
inevitable that the CEE countries would falter in some aspects of reform – and it therefore made 
sense to seek the expert help of the EU. For example, Bulgaria, which experienced a 
hyperinflation crisis in 1996-97 decided to implement a currency board and deliberately 
surrender the conduct of monetary policy to the Bundesbank and, later, the European Central 
Bank. The point here is that countries not undergoing complete systemic change may be less in 
need of EU help and expertise and therefore less responsive to EU conditionality than the CEE 
countries were. In such cases EU signaling may not represent such a meaningful endorsement to 
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a country’s progress. To control for this possibility, I also include Cyprus and Malta in my study 
since they were applying at the same time as the CEE countries, yet they were not undergoing 
complete systemic change.   
In terms of the time-period of this analysis it is likely that risk was perceived as declining 
during the entire candidacy period, as Brussels made clear public assessments whether a 
candidate's policy reforms in various areas conformed to EU standards. Signaling by the EU 
served as reliable public information in an information-scarce environment. When a country's 
progress got validated by the Commission, this translated into a big decrease in perceived risk. 
Investors stopped viewing these countries as emerging markets but as stable OECD countries, 
regardless of the fact that their levels of development might have been the same as before (Gray, 
2009). This suggests that markets may pay less attention to the actual reform course than to EU 
pronouncements on it (Gray, 2009). The universal availability of this information and the 
credibility of its source were considered enough for investors to make more confident choices.  
 
Hypotheses 
This section outlines the institutional specifics of the pre-accession period in the context 
of the EU’s ability to convey credible signals. The EU’s influence varied across the different 
stages of conditionality but the inclusion of a country in the “credible candidate” stage was 
perhaps the first credible enough signal. During the next stage, the negotiation phase, the EU and 
the candidate country agree that the rules pertaining to a specific chapter have been transposed 
and the EU announces this publicly. Studies on signaling in diplomacy (Fearon, 1994) have 
shown that states act in a way to reveal information about their “type” to international audiences 
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in order to enhance their credibility in diplomatic relations. Thus, by cooperating with the 
Commission and working diligently to close the chapters, CEE governments also signal that they 
could be trusted in the future. Thus, in light of the concrete signals that publically deeming a 
country a credible candidate and announcing its progression along the chapters of the acquis 
constitute, I propose the following hypothesis:  
 
H1: Positive signaling during the entire pre-accession period overrides otherwise 
important guidebook considerations for foreign investors, including corruption. 
 
  Upon the successful conclusion of the negotiations and the ratification of the Treaty of 
Accession, a country becomes a full-fledged member of the EU.  This is the end of signaling as 
the granting of membership signifies the full incorporation of the given country into the 
economic and political structures of the EU. While this means that political risk is now at its 
lowest relative point, the leverage of the EU to demand further reforms is more limited. Since 
investors at this point could not reasonably hope for institutional improvement of the same scale 
and pace, they now return to their rational guidebook style of evaluating whether investments 
should or should not be made. In light of this intuition, I propose the following hypothesis: 
 
H2: After membership, investor guidebook principles, such as corruption, resurface as 
important. Corruption control has a positive effect on FDI inflows.  
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Methodological Framework 
The purpose of this section is two-fold. First, I outline the way the dependent variable, 
FDI inflows, the independent variables of interest, the stages of the EU accession process and 
corruption, and all the relevant control variables have been operationalized. Then, I present the 
findings of the statistical analysis, explain the results, discuss their robustness, and analyze the 
mechanisms behind them.  
 
FDI inflows 
This study defines the dependent variable as the annual FDI inflows from 1996 to 2011. 
This is the sum of every year’s new direct investments in a given “host” country by foreign 
capital owners. The measure of FDI inflows comes from the United Nations Conference on 
Trade and Development
22: “An investment involving a long-term relationship and reflecting a 
lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in an entity resident in an 
economy other than of the investor. The direct investor´s purpose is to exert a significant degree 
of influence on the management of the enterprise resident in the other economy. FDI involves 
both the initial transaction between the two entities and all subsequent transactions between them 
and among affiliated enterprises, both incorporated and unincorporated. FDI may be undertaken 
by individuals, as well as business entities.”23 The data is expressed in 2011 US dollars.  
 
                                                          
22
 Developing countries look favorably upon UNCTAD, and these data are least affected by intentional non-
reporting 
 
23
 http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Foreign-Direct-Investment-FDI.aspx (accessed on July 21, 
2014). 
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Corruption 
In order to specify corruption, I refer to the Control of Corruption (CC) index, which is 
part of the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (WGI). Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi 
(KKM), who have developed the index, define CC as an index “capturing perceptions of the 
extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, including both petty and grand forms 
of corruption, as well as "capture" of the state by elites and private interests” (KKM, 2008, p.8). 
Per the existing literature, higher levels of corruption are associated with perceptions of greater 
political risk and lead to less FDI. Wei (2000), Habib and Zurawicki (2002) and Voyer and 
Beamish (2004) all find a statistically significant negative relationship between corruption and 
FDI inflows.  
 
EU Signaling 
As discussed previously there are several reasons to expect that positive EU signaling in 
terms of progress towards accession matters for attracting FDI. First, entrance in to the EU 
means free access to the Single European Market, the largest commercial market in the world. 
Second, it means access to a cheaper but skilled labor force. Third, accession will reduce risk by 
providing more macro-economic, political, institutional, and legal stability. Thus, studies (Bevan, 
Estrin and Grabbe, 2001; Gray, 2009) have confirmed that announcements of progress towards 
EU accession have had an impact on investors’ attitudes towards these countries.  
To operationalize EU signaling, I assigned conditionality dummies to the 12 Eastern 
Enlargement countries in accordance with the stages outlined above. A country receives a 1 for 
the “credible candidate” stage if it has signed an association agreement with the EU but has not 
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yet entered accession negotiations; it receives a 0 otherwise. The “accession negotiations” 
dummy assigns a 1 to countries that have begun accession negotiations but not yet signed a 
Treaty of Accession, and 0 otherwise. Finally, there is no “membership” dummy since the 
second statistical design includes only the years in which all 12 countries have already become 
members. The conditionality dummies are based on the table below. 
 
Table 1: Stages of Conditionality and When They Applied to Particular Countries 
Stage Candidate Country and Period 
Credible Candidate Bulgaria 1996-99, Cyprus 1996-97, Czech Republic 1996-97, Estonia 
1996-97, Hungary 1996-97, Latvia 1996-99, Lithuania 1996-99, Malta 
1998-99, Poland 1996-97, Romania 1996-99, Slovakia 1996-99, 
Slovenia 1996-97 
Accession Negotiations Bulgaria 2000—04, Cyprus 1998--04, Czech Republic 1998--04, 
Estonia 1998--04, Hungary 1998--04, Latvia 2000--04, Lithuania 2000-
-04, Malta 2000--04, Poland 1998--04, Romania 2000-04, Slovakia 
2000-04, Slovenia 1998-04 
Full Membership Bulgaria 2007-12, Cyprus 2004-12, Czech Republic 2004-12, Estonia 
2004-12, Hungary 2004-12, Latvia 2004-12, Lithuania 2004-12, Malta 
2004-12, Poland 2004-12, Romania 2007-12, Slovakia 2004-12, 
Slovenia 2004-12 
 
Alternative Explanations 
The literature on FDI has identified a number of relevant variables affecting FDI into 
transition economies. These include an array of indicators concerning the health and stability of 
the economy and the political system: market size, openness of the economy, inflation, foreign 
reserves, government spending, unit labor costs, and structural reforms providing for a free and 
predictable investment climate.  These alternative explanations are incorporated in the analysis.  
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Host market size 
Host market size is important for FDI for two distinct reasons. First, it can enable 
investors to capture potential economies of scale in terms of production (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; 
Buethe and Milner, 2008; Ang, 2008). Secondly, firms can be drawn to bigger markets in search 
of new market opportunities and consumers (Lankes and Venables, 1996). I operationalize host 
market size using the World Bank’s GDP index (converted into US dollars). 
 
Trade Openness 
Trade openness is another factor that influences FDI in that investors often seek to 
produce for other markets and/or need to import raw or materials for their production from 
abroad (Caves, 1996; Singh and Jun, 1995). In that sense the presence of tariff or non-tariff 
barriers to trade can be detrimental for FDI and FDI and openness of the economy will be 
positively related. I operationalize trade openness as the percent change in volume of imports in 
a given year (Bevan and Estrin, 2000). The measure comes from the World Bank database.  
 
Macroeconomic Indicators 
Inflation and foreign reserves also influence FDI (Bevan and Estrin, 2000; Jimborean and 
Kelber, 2011) as low inflation and high reserves signify macroeconomic stability. To 
operationalize these variables I refer to the World Bank’s World Development Indicators. Thus, I 
define inflation as percent change in annual average consumer prices and reserves as total 
reserves including gold and denominated in current USD.  
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Government Spending 
Levels of government spending also affects FDI in that in an attempt to attract FDI 
governments decrease levels of capital taxation which leads to less government spending 
(Jensen, 2006). While there is mixed evidence on this intuition, many studies include this 
control. I operationalize government spending as the percent change in government total 
expenditure (World Bank).  
 
Unit Labor Cost 
Profitability from the perspective of foreign investors is intrinsically connected to unit 
labor costs (Holland and Pain, 1998). Access to an affordable labor, exhibiting high levels of 
skill and training and a solid scientific base (EBRD, 1999), is considered a fundamental 
comparative advantage of the region (Maeyer, 2006; Bevan and Estrin, 2000). Importantly, 
investors are attracted to cheap labor only if it is not crowded out by lower productivity or an 
overvalued currency. Thus, I include gross average wages, denominated in US Dollars, as 
indexed by the United Nations Economic Commission for Europe.  
 
Structural Reforms 
Another possible alternative explanation is that markets simply respond to policy reform 
by governments and not merely EU signaling. During the negotiations phase of conditionality, 
many countries underwent stringent periods of policy reform in order to qualify for membership 
(Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier, 2005). Therefore, increasing FDI may be just a function of the 
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introduction of or perceived effectiveness of a reform (Forbes, 2006; Campos and Kinoshita, 
2008), rather than merely signaling.  
To assess the role of reforms I use several EBRD reform indexes, which I average out: 
large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, 
competition policy, price liberalization, and trade and forex reform. Importantly these measures 
reflect the degree of reform and not necessarily its effectiveness. The degree being important in 
its own right, I take additional steps to isolate the effect of structural reforms on the investment 
climate.  
The investment freedom index produced by the Heritage Foundation seems particularly 
relevant in terms of how reforms have affected the investment environment of a country.
24
 The 
index is based on several assumptions: “In an economically free country, there would be no 
constraints on the flow of investment capital. Individuals and firms would be allowed to move 
their resources into and out of specific activities, both internally and across the country’s borders, 
without restriction. Such an ideal country would receive a score of 100 on investment 
freedom.”25 In reality countries impose an array of restrictions to investment behavior and the 
index takes many of them into account: investment restrictions based on nationality, burdensome 
foreign investment code in terms of transparency and bureaucratic structures, restrictions on land 
ownership, various sectoral restrictions or barriers, commonality of expropriations of investment 
without due compensation, foreign exchange controls, capital controls in terms of instances of 
repatriation of profits or need for government approval for various transactions. These are all 
                                                          
24
 The Heritage Foundation produces the index based on information from a variety of sources including the 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 2010–2013; Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, 2013 
National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade Barriers; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Country 
Commercial Guide, 2010–2013. 
 
25
 http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology (accessed on July 23, 2014). 
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factors that cater directly to the quality of the investment environment both in terms of its legal 
underpinning and its practical suitability.  
In addition to these specific indicators of degree and practice of reforms, some studies 
have also suggested an alternative method to evaluate the effectiveness of reform. They include 
macroeconomic indicators, such as inflation, as proxies for reform given that they represent an 
economic reality that is directly the result of government policy choices or lack thereof. Such 
economic indicators are already present in my models.  
 
The Financial Crisis 
The credit crunch and recession that ensued coincided with a collapse of FDI inflows to 
CEE. In 2009, FDI inflows to the CEE region were 50% lower than in 2008 (Economic Review, 
PriceWaterHouseCooper, 2010). In order to control for the independent adverse effects on FDI 
inflows generated by the financial crisis of 2008, I employ two strategies. First, I include a 
control variable for every country for every year measuring the presence and magnitude of the 
crisis. The variable comes from the Luc Leaven and Fabian Valencia (2012) dataset which 
covers the universe of systemic banking crises for the period 1970-2012, and also includes data 
on the resolution and fiscal and economic costs of banking crises. Second, I include a measure 
for global FDI inflows for every year, thus accounting for the global-level fluctuations of FDI, 
which are profoundly affected by financial crises, such as the one of 2008. The inclusion of these 
variables in the time series controls for the negative effect of the financial crisis on FDI inflows.  
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Time Series Analysis 
The statistical part of this article utilizes a time-series cross-sectional regression analysis 
to examine the effect of EU signaling before and after accession on investor confidence in in the 
12 countries of the 5
th
 enlargement. Data on FDI inflows and a number of variables which may 
affect them are available over the period 1996-2011. Pooled time-series datasets such as this one 
introduce great challenges for researchers. The presence of relationships within countries and in 
particular time periods means that there will be serial correlation among observations (as 
confirmed by the Woolridge test), as well as structure in the error terms. To tackle 
autocorrelation (and any other unspecified spurious correlation) I employ two methods. First, I 
include a lagged dependent variable in both the pre- and post-accession models (Keele and 
Kelly, 2006; Beck and Katz, 2011).
26
 Additionally, I utilize panel-corrected standard errors to 
reduce the possibility for biased standard errors and inefficient estimates resulting from 
contemporaneous correlation across units and unit level heteroskedastisity (Beck and Katz, 
1995). To cross-validate the results of this approach I also use Prais-Winsten transformations, 
which allow for estimations in the presence of auto-correlated errors, again with panel-corrected 
standard errors. Finally, I also include a fixed effects model as an additional method to control 
for potential structural issues in the dataset. The main substantive results are consistent across 
estimations which serves as a robustness check for the findings. Additionally, the findings do not 
change under bootstrapping and jack-knifing.
27
 Table 2 below presents the results of the six 
quantitative models.   
                                                          
26
 In addition to addressing this methodological challenge, including a lagged FDI is theoretically justified since 
researchers have consistently found FDI to be self-reinforcing (Wheeler and Mody 1992). 
 
27
 Using subsets of available data (jackknifing) or drawing randomly with replacement from a set of data points 
(bootstrapping) produces estimates of the precision of coefficients. 
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Table 2: FDI Drivers Before and After EU Accession 
Models A (pre-accession) and D (post-accession) are LDV regressions with panel-corrected 
standard errors; models B (pre-accession) and E (post-accession) are Prais-Winsten regressions 
with panel-corrected standard errors; models C (pre-accession) and F (post-accession) are Fixed 
Effects models. ∗∗∗p < .01; ∗∗p < .05; ∗p < .10. One-tailed test where appropriate. 
 Before Accession After Accession 
Drivers Model A 
LDV 
Model B 
Prais-
Winsten 
Model C 
Fixed 
Effects 
Model D 
LDV 
Model E 
Prais-
Winsten 
Model F 
Fixed 
Effects 
Lagged FDI 
.210 
(.258) 
 -.123 
(.178) 
.427*** 
(.180) 
 .189** 
(.101) 
Credible 
Candidate  
1342.716*** 
(365.209) 
1260.529*** 
(325.051) 
1380.85** 
(712.937) 
 
 
  
Accession 
Negotiations 
1145.011*** 
(194.969) 
952.090*** 
(205.957) 
992.047** 
(551.348) 
   
Corruption 
Control 
147.773 
(348.738) 
-170.028 
(370.491) 
330.821 
(1057.837) 
3179.355*** 
(987.865) 
4007.583** 
(1789.634) 
3695.363* 
(2698.353) 
Structural 
Reform 
38.169* 
(24.164) 
59.410** 
(28.582) 
107.362 
(98.777) 
-69.024 
(101.140)  
-87.496 
(142.060)   
-57.682 
(351.086) 
Investment 
Climate  
7.010 
(11.991) 
18.961** 
(10.393) 
1.611 
(21.799) 
-52.689** 
(24.949)      
-83.627** 
(39.419)      
.373 
(51.409) 
Market Size -.276 
(1.645) 
.339 
(2.338) 
-11.484 
(50.741) 
-4.678 
(3.921)     
-9.732** 
(5.222)  
-4.714 
(16.668) 
Trade 
Openness 
.803 
(10.220) 
-8.347 
(6.840) 
-3.277 
(12.038) 
25.862** 
(13.677)      
27.163** 
(10.778)      
44.013*** 
(18.243) 
Inflation 2.010 
(2.091) 
2.486** 
(1.300) 
-.129 
(9.908) 
-.972 
(1.272)    
-1.374 
(1.348)   
-6.794** 
(3.505) 
Reserves 1.530** 
(6.860) 
1.960*** 
(3.960) 
1.560 
(8.710) 
9.760*** 
(3.900)  
1.380*** 
(3.680)  
-2.510 
(3.680) 
Unit Labor 
Costs 
-.220 
(.473) 
-.329 
(.432) 
.702 
(1.742) 
-2.303*** 
(.534) 
-3.084*** 
(.732) 
-4.670*** 
(1.953) 
Government 
Spending 
-7.890 
(9.742) 
-21.741** 
(10.773) 
-17.605 
(38.639) 
-51.252** 
(22.779) 
-77.645*** 
(32.850) 
-43.316 
(54.503) 
Global FDI .001 
(.001) 
.001 
(.001) 
-2.470 
(.001) 
.002*** 
(001) 
.003*** 
(.001) 
004*** 
(.001) 
Financial 
Crisis 
767.455 
(1023.969) 
453.752 
(437.931) 
-302.200 
(864.3414) 
-494.907 
(666.477) 
-82.174 
(874.730) 
1839.152 
(1235.37) 
Constant -2876.364** 
(1308.769) 
-3829.83*** 
(1093.076) 
-3625.707 
(6409.586) 
8065.217 
(4276.881) 
11962.01** 
(6207.93) 
7752.874 
(14473.02) 
R-squared 77 83 13 75 61 36 
Wald Chi2 355.42 834.31  491.46 85.55  
Number of 
Observations 
72 80 72 95 95 95 
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The results of all the LDV, the Prais-Winsten, and FE models confirm the hypotheses that 
corruption control has a positive and significant effect on FDI after accession but is insignificant 
before, when EU signaling is a strong (the strongest) predictor of FDI inflows. A number of 
other important factors for investors, including trade openness and unit labor costs, exhibit the 
same relationship – insignificant, while the countries were applying to the EU and were 
receiving positive endorsements from the EU about their progress, and significant after 
membership, when signaling was no longer present, and investors no longer felt that they can 
discount guidebook principles in the short-run in the name of a more hopeful promise for the 
future.  
The results from the pre-accession models provide some evidence of how the availability 
heuristic might have affected investors’ attitudes and decision making in this period. Looking at 
the more restrictive LDV and FE models one can see that while most investor guidebook 
considerations are insignificant in the pre-accession period, EU signaling in both the “credible 
candidate stage” and during the “accession negotiations” had positive and significant effects on 
investor confidence. All three model specifications focusing on this time period demonstrate that 
positive signaling inspired investor confidence to an extent that overshadowed a wide array of 
other considerations that should theoretically matter (trade openness, market size, wages).  
There are a few other insights based on the LDV and Prais-Winsten models worth 
mentioning. First, both return significant results for foreign reserves. Expectedly, ceteris paribus 
higher foreign reserves served as ground for greater investor confidence in the macroeconomic 
resilience of a country and encouraged more FDI inflows. One can also notice that the two 
models provide some evidence that structural reforms mattered in the pre-accession period. 
Expectedly, to the extent that the degree of reforms, as defined by the EBRD, affected investors, 
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these effects were positive and FDI increased as a result of the introduction of the various 
structural reforms.
28
 Last, the pre-accession Prais-Winsten model also provides some support for 
the conjecture that increased government spending would have a negative effect on FDI inflows. 
The results from the post-accession models add further insights into the psychological 
state of foreign investors making decisions in evolving investment environments. With EU 
signaling no longer available to help investors filter information, channel inferences, and form 
(positive) expectations, the natural biases and distortions that come with the availability heuristic 
are now gone. Traditional guidebook approaches to investment, based on comprehensive 
rationality rather than bounded rationality, resurface in this time period and a great number of 
theoretically relevant FDI drivers again become significant. Greater openness to trade, higher 
reserves, lower government spending, lower wages, and notably, better corruption control (p < 
0.10 in the FE model), each lead to more FDI inflows, all else equal. These variables come with 
signs and levels of statistical significance consistent with theory and prior studies.
29
  
 
                                                          
28
 Large scale privatization, small scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, 
price liberalization, and trade and forex reform. 
 
29
 Interestingly, the variable estimating the friendliness of the investment climate comes with a negative sign and is 
also statistically significant. The index (investment freedom), produced by the Heritage Foundation, deals with 
issues, such as restrictions based on nationality, expropriations of property without due compensation, and various 
capital and exchange rate controls. One interpretation would be that in the post-accession period most of these 
considerations have been addressed to a satisfactory degree in the context of the Single Market. If so, attempts at 
further liberalizations, perhaps to capture more FDI, may at this point not be as impressive to investors as other 
factors, such as wages or reserves, both exhibiting very high levels of statistical significance. Thus, for example, if 
we compare the performance of the three least restrictive countries Estonia (average score of 90), Hungary (average 
score 73) and Latvia (average score 73), and the most restrictive one, Bulgaria (average score of 55) in the post 
accession period, one can notice that Bulgaria attracted more FDI than each of the three and it also had lower wages 
(roughly 30% of wages in Estonia and Hungary and 45% of wages in Latvia) and higher reserves.  
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Survey 
30
 
In order to explain how signaling affected the way investors perceived the importance of 
corruption and other factors, I now turn to a discussion of the survey I was able to administer. 
The survey attempts to shed more light into the psychological state of investors and explain to 
what extent corruption mattered and matters for their decisions and affects trends in FDI.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                          
30
 The results discussed here feature the answers of 36 respondents who are engaged in FDI activity, 32 in Bulgaria 
and four in Cyprus. 
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Figure 2: FDI in Bulgaria in millions of USD 1996-2012 
31
 
 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development: 
http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-database.aspx, accessed in July 
2014) 
 
The results of the survey confirm the findings from the regression analysis. They show 
that although corruption mattered for investors both before and after accession, the perceived 
                                                          
31
 This trend is generalizable to all 12 countries that joined in 2004-07 as FDI inflows declined post-accession in 
Cyprus 2007, Bulgaria 2007, Latvia 2007, Lithuania 2007, Poland 2007, Romania 2008, Slovenia 2008, Malta 2006, 
Slovakia 2006, Estonia 2005, Hungary 2005, and Czech Republic 2005. Importantly, all but two (Slovenia and 
Romania) of these declines took place soon after these countries’ accessions, but before the financial crisis (Note: 
Slovenia’s and Romania’s FDI as a percent of GDP had actually also started to decrease before the crisis, in 2007 
and 2006 respectively). Even in the five cases when the decline is shown to have started in 2007 (also the accession 
year for Bulgaria and Romania), the monthly data on the downward trend in 2007 precede the crisis’s beginning, 
which can be dated  August 9, 2007, when BNP Paribas stopped withdrawals from three hedge funds citing "a 
complete evaporation of liquidity" (Elliot 2012, available at: http://www.theguardian.com/business/economics-
blog/2012/aug/05/economic-crisis-myths-sustain). Relatedly, the crisis truly peaked in 2008 and FDI by nature does 
not respond to market trends as instantaneously as the stock market. In the other cases the decline started within one 
or two years after accession and before the crisis. 
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economic and institutional benefits of membership were high on investors’ minds before 
accession and disproportionally affected their decisions. The questions asked focused on two 
broad categories – investors’ attitudes toward corruption before and after accession as an 
important factor for FDI and their susceptibility to EU signaling as a trigger to activating the 
availability heuristic. The survey was administered in person and via email in the summer of 
2013 and featured 32 respondents representing several countries, including the USA, Greece, 
Germany, Austria, and the United Arab Emirates, with investments in core sectors of the 
Bulgarian economy, such as real estate, financial services, communications, agriculture, and 
retail.
32
 There were four additional respondents investing in Cyprus.
33
 The respondents occupied 
mid and high-level management positions and were involved either in the initial investment 
decision or current decisions about further investments.   
 The first round of questions assesses attitudes towards corruption before and after 
accession. Notwithstanding the limitation that questions like that are prone to "backward" 
misremembering or biased updating, the results reveal an interesting story. Most respondents 
confirm that corruption was an important consideration for them both before and after EU 
membership, but a greater majority of investors (33 v. 28) seem to be more concerned about 
corruption in the post-accession period.
34
 Nevertheless, I expected the difference here to be more 
                                                          
32
 The sample frame included 54 potential respondents, representing firms with investments in four of the top five 
sectors of the Bulgarian economy (Real Estate (1
st
), Financial Intermediation (2
nd
), Retail (4
th
), and Communications 
(5
th
) as well as four of the top ten investing countries (Austria (2
nd
), Greece (3
rd
), Germany (6
th
), USA (10
th
)). 
Source: US Department of State 2013 Investment Report on Bulgaria. Available at: 
http://www.state.gov/e/eb/rls/othr/ics/2013/204610.htm (accessed on January 9, 2015).   
 
33
 The sample frame included four potential respondents, three from Greece and one from the US investing in real 
estate and development.  
 
34
 A review of a number of issues of the Global Competitiveness report cross-validates these findings as it shows 
that corruption increased in importance as a “problematic factor for doing business” between the pre-accession and 
post-accession periods in five out of the six countries (Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Estonia, and 
Hungary) that I found information on, with only Estonia being an exception. The Global Competitiveness report is 
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pronounced which makes me wonder whether there could be some biased updating as investors 
do not want to admit that they really discounted or overlooked such an important factor before 
accession.  
Figure 3: Effects of corruption on FDI before and after accession 
  
The next couple of questions try to establish the current rate and state of these 
investments and ask for the potential reasons for their slowdown or stagnation.  
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
based on the opinions of an average of 98 experts per country representing the main sectors of the economy 
(agriculture, manufacturing industry, non-manufacturing industry, and services). For more info: 
http://www3.weforum.org/docs/GCR2011-12/6.GCR2011-2012Chapter1.3EOS.pdf (accessed on July 26, 2014). 
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Figure 4: Current state of FDI and the reasons for it 
  
The results here are interesting. Expectedly, zero participants said that their firm was 
disinvesting or withdrawing since FDI tends to be very sticky (Liebscher 2007). Interestingly, 
however, 26 out of the 29 who said that their investment rate has slowed down or remained the 
same, pointed out coprruption as one of the main reasons for this. In fact these people singled out 
corruption as the most important reason, ahead of “inefficient government bureacracy” (22 
answers) and “access to financing” (21), the main corrolary of the financial crisis of 2008. These 
answers raise an intersting question: If corruption mattered for investment decisions before 
accession almost as much as it matters now, and it is a top reason to slow down investment now, 
why did people invest back then? Why was corruption discounted? Could it be the case that as 
much as it mattered, or was supposed to matter, EU-related factors overrrode its relevance?  
 The next set of questions aim to establish investors’ susceptability to signaling as well as 
the rationalized effect of signaling on their behavior. The first four questions attempt to directly 
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assess the possibility of behavior having been driven by the availability heuristic. They try to 
answer the question of how signaling affected behavior. 
Figure 5: Conditions for the Availability Heuristic 
  
  
 
 About two-thirds of the respondents did think that they were making the initial decision 
in an information-scarce environment (at least to a certain extent) and more than two-thirds were 
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influenced by Bulgaria’s or Cyprus’s progress towards membership, both constituting necessary 
conditions for the availability heuristic. There are two psychological states that these two 
answers point at. As reform often preceded the actual closure of negotiating chapters, those who 
felt that their access to reliable information was good or adequate (9), saw the EU’s 
endorsements as credible public knowledge and felt encouraged. At the same time those who felt 
that the information environment in a young democracy was uncertain (22), elected not to search 
for more information as comprehensive rationality would entail, but turned to the inferential 
strategies of bounded rationality and perceived the EU signals as fundamental information in its 
own right. In both cases then investors were affected by signaling, either more than, or as well as 
by their individual (objective) assessment of the actual quality of the investment environment.  
 The other two questions in this section look at other, more obvious aspects of the 
availability heuristic, namely the influence of the behavior of others and the tendency to 
exaggerate the importance of vivid information, such as EU endorsements. Only a small minority 
of investors say that they were influenced by others to a large extent, but half admit that they 
were influenced at least to a certain one. This is not surprising because from an economic 
perspective the CEE countries constituted new markets where a first-mover advantage could be 
crucial. Similarly, from a psychological perspective the (herding) behavior of groups in its own 
right can be seen as legitimating, as evidenced by the wide and growing literature in behavioral 
economics (Banerjee, 1992; Shiller, 1995). Finally, although some investors expectedly refuse to 
admit that they discounted factors other than the EU when making their decision, about two-
thirds says that this might have been the case, though only to a certain extent.  
 The last two questions in this section try to answer the question of why signaling had the 
strong and positive effect it did. When asked why they invested in Bulgaria in the first place, two 
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of the top three reasons pointed at have something to do with the EU – predictability from EU 
membership and access to the single market, with low wages being the other important factor. 
Thus, it is evident that although investors say that they cared about everything and they took 
every guidebook factor into account, EU-related factors were high one their minds.  
Figure 6: Reasons to invest in Bulgaria 
 
The next question asks about the reasons why the EU announcements had an effect on 
their decision-making.  
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Figure 7: Reasons why EU announcements matter 
 
There are a couple of observations worth noticing here. A great majority (24) accepted 
the EU assessments as proof that reforms were happening. Indeed, the accession process was 
highly meritocratic (Vachudova, 2005) and it made sense for investors to take progress as 
valuable information. However, more than a third of these 24 respondents (10) also said that 
other information was not reliable, which means that they did allow the EU signals to trigger the 
availability heuristic, which helps channel information but also creates the risk of significant 
distortions of and biases against other sources of information, such as other fundamentals. 
Finally, more than two-thirds of investors also said that the promise of institutional stability and 
predictability mattered to them, an argument firmly in line with established theories of 
international relations (Keohane, 1984; Morrow, 1994; North, 1990).   
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Interviews 
To supplement the findings from the statistical analysis and the survey I also conducted 
interviews with Greek and American investors who are engaged in FDI activity in Bulgaria. The 
interviews showed that investors did indeed resort to using the inferential shortcuts that the EU 
progress reports provided during the accession period and selectively discounted other 
information in the hope for post-accession appreciation of their assets and more streamlined 
penetration of their services. The interviewees were involved in several sectors of the economy 
including real estate, financial services, construction, agriculture, and energy. All interviewees 
were univocal that the investment environment in the country was uncertain until 1997 as 
Bulgaria had no specific legislation on FDI. In October 1997 the Foreign Investment Act (FIA) 
created the first legal framework for foreign investment which was up to par with accepted 
international standards. This precedent as well as the aggressive privatization reform of the late 
1990s created a fertile ground for investment. One of the companies, a fund of funds, which I 
interviewed, invested a total of $250 million between 1999 and 2006. This company provided me 
with specific data regarding their investments (in thousands of Euros) since 2007.  
 
Table 3: FDI Post-accession of a Fund of Funds 
 
One can notice the sharp slowdown of the investment rate following the accession of 
Bulgaria to the EU (2007) and the beginning of the financial crisis (2008). Following the 
hypotheses of this article, I asked about the major investment drivers before accession and the 
Year 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013
FDI 44,445 25,533 2,416 1,339 2,086 1,426 300
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main reasons for the slowdown: “It was easier to sell ideas to investors [before accession], both 
because we had the EU accession chip to play and because credit access conditions at home were 
more favorable…Now, even when money is available, the bar is higher and the corruption-
ridden energy sector is raising questions with our investors,” said the manager of this fund which 
manages an array of investments in several sectors (Interview summer 2013). Evidently, before 
accession US investors were eager to invest and were encouraged by the prospect of 
membership. After accession, capitalizing on “hope” was more difficult even if funding was 
available. Thus, in 2008 this fund created a platform that secured €50 million in equity to invest 
in renewable energy projects (solar, wind, geothermal, and hydroelectric). With the money 
secured, however, the project was put on hold due to corruption considerations (amidst otherwise 
strong macroeconomic fundamentals). Such strict due-diligence was not the norm before 
accession when corruption was just as relevant and influential in the Bulgarian market. Since 
2008 the company has slowed down its investment rate, employed less staff, and actively sought 
other sectors of the economy to invest in where predictability is high, barriers to entry low, and 
the government involvement less.  
Such marked change in attitudes towards investing in Bulgaria is not unique to just this 
fund of funds. Twenty-two out of the twenty-five investors I interviewed stated that the prospect 
of EU accession was overwhelmingly more important for their companies than other factors and 
that positive EU announcements encouraged investments. Nineteen defined decision-making 
now using words such as “more structured”, “risk-averse”, “unemotional”, “critical”, “rational”, 
“objective”, “straight-forward”, “cautious”, “programmatic”, and “piecemeal”, alluding to the 
return of the more rational approach to investing in the absence of vivid endorsements 
stimulating the availability heuristic. Importantly, when asked whether they regret investing in 
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Bulgaria or feel misled by the EU accession process, again twenty-two said that they had higher 
expectations for corruption control post-accession and that their companies probably 
overinvested in the years leading to membership. This intuition can be corroborated by 
comparing the average FDI inflows in the new EU post-communist members before and after 
accession to the FDI inflows in post-communist countries that have never been part of the 
accession process.  
 
Table 4: FDI in EU and non-EU post-communist countries 
35
 
 
EU applicant countries attracted significantly more FDI as they were moving along the 
accession process (5.63% vs. 4.74%) due to the “EU bump” – the fact that investors anticipated 
economic predictability and political stability associated with EU membership. Interestingly, 
however, non-EU post-communist countries have attracted more FDI (7.20% vs. 6.48%) in the 
post-accession period suggesting that when signaling (and hope) is out of the picture, FDI rates 
in post-communist EU members are actually lower than those in a peer group with a similar 
communist legacy.  
Commenting on the change in the investment climate in Bulgaria after its accession, 
some foreign investors have publically singled out corruption as an impediment to their 
operations. Complaining about the business environment in the film industry, David Varod, CEO 
                                                          
35
 The non-EU post-communist countries here are: Russia, Ukraine, Moldova, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Serbia. The time period is 1998-2011.  
New EU post-communist member avg Non EU post-communist country avg
Before Accession 5.63 4.74
After Accession 6.48 7.20
Foreign direct investment, net inflows (% of GDP)
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of Nu Boyana Film Studios
36, recently said that, “Corruption eats the country.” Similarly, Alex 
Nestor, vice president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Bulgaria, admitted that “The 
investment climate in the country is not something we can be proud of,” when speaking precisely 
of the corruption-ridden energy sector (New York Times, July 7, 2014).
37
  
The interviews, therefore, also provide credence to the notion that before accession 
progress towards the EU encouraged investors and might have caused them to discount or 
overlook otherwise important factors. Similarly, when the hope for further improvements 
decreased after membership as a result of lower EU leverage, other (“more structured”, 
“rational”, and “straight-forward”) factors, and corruption in particular, reemerged as influential 
considerations for FDI.  
 
Conclusion 
This article shows that corruption has a differential effect on FDI inflows in the countries 
of the 5
th
 enlargement before and after their accession to the EU. The main finding is that when 
the EU sends clear positive signals during the accession period, foreign investors’ confidence 
gets boosted to the extent that they discount an array of fundamental considerations that are 
otherwise important, such as corruption. The situation changes after accession as the EU no 
longer sends such signals. Thus, once a country is part of the bloc, fundamental factors reemerge 
as important and investors may choose to punish countries that are perceived as lagging behind, 
static, or backsliding. There are several contributions that this article makes. First, it introduces 
                                                          
36
 This was the venue where “The Expendables 3” starring Sylvester Stallone and Arnold Schwarzenegger, was shot. 
 
37
 http://www.nytimes.com/2014/07/08/business/international/bank-runs-in-bulgaria-expose-fragility-and-
flaws.html?_r=4 (accessed on July 26, 2014). 
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the possibility that the post-accession FDI dynamic might be different for Western and Eastern 
Europe. FDI in Western European democracies became easier after these countries joined the EU 
but in the East countries had to in some ways satisfy stricter criteria after their accession. While 
the EU integration literature has established a definite positive and lasting effect of EU 
membership for Western European countries, there has been no systematic study evaluating the 
membership effect on CEE. Second, this article sheds more light on the question whether 
corruption matters for FDI. Although the consensus seems to be that it does, there are some 
dissenting voices. What my argument contributes to this debate is that different conditions may 
make corruption more or less salient of an issue for foreign investors. Finally, my arguments 
contribute to the literature on institutional signaling. Building on it I show how signaling 
progress and granting actual membership may have differential impact on investor confidence 
through first triggering psychological inferential shortcuts, such as the availability heuristic, but 
then returning the levers of decision making to comprehensive rational analysis. 
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APPENDIX B: Variable measurement and Descriptive Statistics  
Table B.1: Variable Measurement  
Foreign 
Direct 
Investment 
The sum of all annual new FDI inflows in US Dollars at 2012 prices and 2012 
exchange rates in millions. An investment involving a long-term relationship and 
reflecting a lasting interest of a resident entity in one economy (direct investor) in 
an entity resident in an economy other than of the investor For associates and 
subsidiaries, FDI flows consist of the net sales of shares and loans (including non-
cash acquisitions made against equipment, manufacturing rights, etc.) to the 
parent company plus the parent firm´s share of the affiliate´s reinvested earnings 
plus total net intra-company loans (short- and long-term) provided by the parent 
company. For branches, FDI flows consist of the increase in reinvested earnings 
plus the net increase in funds received from the foreign direct investor. FDI flows 
with a negative sign (reverse flows) indicate that at least one of the components in 
the above definition is negative and not offset by positive amounts of the 
remaining components. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-
database.aspx, accessed in July 2014. 
EU Signaling Signaling dummies to the 12 Eastern Enlargement countries are assigned in 
accordance with the application stages they were in during the respective years in 
the dataset. A country receives a 1 for the “credible candidate” stage if it has 
signed an association agreement with the EU but has not yet entered accession 
negotiations; it receives a 0 otherwise. The “accession negotiations” dummy 
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assigns a 1 to countries that have begun accession negotiations but have not yet 
signed a Treaty of Accession, and 0 otherwise. Source: Author. 
Corruption 
Control 
The Control of Corruption Index (one of the six World Governance Indicators 
(WGI)). The Control of Corruption Index is a composite governance indicator 
based on 32 underlying data sources.  These data sources are rescaled and 
combined to create an aggregate using an unobserved components model (UCM). 
The UCM assumes that the observed data from each source are a linear function 
of the unobserved level of governance, plus an error term.  This linear function is 
different for different data sources, and so corrects for the remaining non-
comparability of units of the rescaled data noted above.  The resulting estimates 
of governance are a weighted average of the data from each source, with weights 
reflecting the pattern of correlation among data sources.   The UCM assigns 
greater weight to data sources that tend to be more strongly correlated with each 
other.  While this weighting improves the statistical precision of the aggregate 
indicators, it typically does not affect very much the ranking of countries on the 
aggregate indicators.  The composite measures of corruption control generated by 
the UCM are in units of a standard normal distribution, with mean zero, standard 
deviation of one, and running from approximately -2.5 to 2.5, with higher values 
corresponding to better outcomes. The measure is useful as a tool for broad cross-
country comparisons and for evaluating broad trends over time. Source: World 
Bank: http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/index.aspx#doc, accessed in July 
2014.  
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Host Market 
Size 
Gross domestic product, current prices. Values are based upon GDP in national 
currency converted to U.S. dollars using market exchange rates (yearly average). 
Exchange rate projections are provided by country economists for the group of 
other emerging market and developing countries. Exchanges rates for advanced 
economies are established in the WEO assumptions for each WEO exercise. 
Expenditure-based GDP is total final expenditures at purchasers’ prices 
(including the f.o.b. value of exports of goods and services), less the f.o.b. value 
of imports of goods and services. Annual figures in billions of USD. Source: 
World Bank. 
Trade 
Openness 
Percent change in volume of imports of goods and services. Percent change of 
volume of imports refers to the aggregate change in the quantities of total imports 
whose characteristics are unchanged. The goods and services and their prices are 
held constant, therefore changes are due to changes in quantities only.  Source: 
World Bank. 
Inflation Inflation, average consumer prices. Expressed in averages for the year, not end-
of-period data. A consumer price index (CPI) measures changes in the prices of 
goods and services that households consume. Such changes affect the real 
purchasing power of consumers’ incomes and their welfare. As the prices of 
different goods and services do not all change at the same rate, a price index can 
only reflect their average movement. A price index is typically assigned a value 
of unity, or 100, in some reference period and the values of the index for other 
periods of time are intended to indicate the average proportionate, or percentage, 
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change in prices from this price reference period. Price indices can also be used to 
measure differences in price levels between different cities, regions or countries at 
the same point in time. [CPI Manual 2004, Introduction] For euro countries, 
consumer prices are calculated based on harmonized prices. For more information 
see http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/cache/ITY_OFFPUB/KS-BE-04-001/EN/KS-
BE-04-001-EN.PDF.] Source: World Bank. 
Government 
Spending 
Government Expenditure as a percent of GDP. Total expenditure consists of total 
expense and the net acquisition of nonfinancial assets. Note: Apart from being on 
an accrual basis, total expenditure differs from the GFSM 1986 definition of total 
expenditure in the sense that it also takes the disposals of nonfinancial assets into 
account. Source: World Bank. 
Unit Labor 
Cost 
Gross average wages, denominated in US Dollars at current exchange rates. Gross 
average monthly wages cover total wages and salaries in cash and in kind, before 
any tax deduction and before social security contributions. They include wages 
and salaries, remuneration for time not worked, bonuses and gratuities paid by the 
employer to the employee. For most countries wages cover total economy and are 
expressed per full-time equivalent employee. This enables comparison of 
different countries irrespective of the length of working time and the share of 
part-time and full-time workers.  
Source: UNECE Statistical Database: 
http://w3.unece.org/pxweb/dialog/varval.asp?ma=60_MECCWagesY_r&path=../
database/STAT/20-ME/3 
178 
 
MELF/&lang=1&ti=Gross+Average+Monthly+Wages+by+Country+and+Year, 
accessed in July 2014.  
Foreign 
Reserves 
Total reserves (includes gold, current US Dollars). Source: World Bank.  
Structural 
Reforms 
Average of the six EBRD transition indicators: large scale privatization, small 
scale privatization, governance and enterprise restructuring, competition policy, 
price liberalization, and trade and forex reform. These have been used to track 
reform developments in all countries of operations since 1989. Progress is 
measured against the standards of industrialized market economies, while 
recognizing that there is neither a “pure” market economy nor a unique end-point 
for transition. The measurement scale for the indicators ranges from 1 to 4+, 
where 1 represents little or no change from a rigid centrally planned economy and 
4+ represents the standards of an industrialized market economy. Source: EBRD: 
http://www.ebrd.com/what-we-do/economic-research-and-data/data/forecasts-
macro-data-transition-indicators.html, accessed in July 2014. 
 
An additional measure of the extent of structural reforms is the Investment 
Freedom Index of the Heritage Foundation. The index evaluates a variety of 
regulatory restrictions that are typically imposed on investment. Points are 
deducted from the ideal score of 100 for each of the restrictions found in a 
country’s investment regime. It is not necessary for a government to impose all of 
the listed restrictions at the maximum level to effectively eliminate investment 
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freedom. Those few governments that impose so many restrictions that they total 
more than 100 points in deductions have had their scores set at zero. Investment 
restrictions are divided into seven categories: investment restrictions based on 
nationality, burdensome foreign investment code in terms of transparency and 
bureaucratic structures, restrictions on land ownership, various sectoral 
restrictions or barriers, commonality of expropriations of investment without due 
compensation, foreign exchange controls, capital controls in terms of instances of 
repatriation of profits or need for government approval for various transactions. 
The index relies on the following sources for data on capital flows and foreign 
investment, in order of priority: official government publications of each country; 
Economist Intelligence Unit, Country Commerce, 2010–2013; Office of the U.S. 
Trade Representative, 2013 National Trade Estimate Report on Foreign Trade 
Barriers; and U.S. Department of Commerce, Country Commercial Guide, 2010–
2013. Source: The Heritage Foundation: 
http://www.heritage.org/index/book/methodology, accessed in July 2014.  
The 
Financial 
Crisis 
A dummy variable for every country for every year measuring the presence a 
banking crisis. The variable comes from the Luc Leaven and Fabian Valencia 
(2012) dataset (Systemic Banking Crises Database: An Update) which covers the 
universe of systemic banking crises for the period 1970-2011. The database 
includes all systemic banking, currency, and sovereign debt crises during the 
period 1970–2011. A banking crisis is defined as systemic if two conditions are 
met: 
1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by 
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significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and/or bank liquidations) 
2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant 
losses in the banking system. 
The first year of the crisis is the one when both criteria are met. Source: IMF: 
https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/cat/longres.aspx?sk=26015.0, accessed in July 
2014.  
 
An additional control for the effects of the financial crisis on investment is global 
FDI. This is the sum of the FDI inflows in all countries in the world for every 
year in the dataset. Source: United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development: http://unctad.org/en/Pages/DIAE/FDI%20Statistics/Interactive-
database.aspx, accessed in July 2014.  
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Table B.2: Descriptive Statistics  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Measure/Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
FDI inflows 204 2,952.68                     3,899.84                     (652.50)                 23,560.76                     
Lagged FDI inflows 192 2,934.99                     3,887.08                     (652.50)                 23,560.76                     
Credible Candidate 204 0.17                             0.37                             -                         1.00                                
Accession Negotiations 204 0.25                             0.44                             -                         1.00                                
Corruption Control 192 0.41                             0.49                             (0.82)                     1.80                                
EBRD Structural Reforms 204 47.14                           5.81                             24.00                     54.00                             
Global FDI 204 1,106,143.00             471,895.50                391,439.30          2,002,695.00               
Trade Openness 200 8.05                             19.45                           (61.37)                   148.17                           
Unit Labor Cost 202 899.14                         684.66                         75.60                     3,078.70                       
Foreign Reserves 204 13,000,000,000.00  18,200,000,000.00  207,000,000.00  109,000,000,000.00  
Investment Freedom 204 66.67                           12.15                           30.00                     90.00                             
Host Market Size 204 48.32                           67.27                           0.53                       267.94                           
Inflation 204 181.93                         223.08                         14.35                     1,688.83                       
Government Spending 192 28.92                           13.31                           12.10                     82.08                             
Current Account Balance 204 4.44                             18.91                           (52.29)                   50.73                             
Financial Crisis 204 0.14                             0.35                             -                         1.00                                
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APPENDIX C: FDI Stock per Capita in the EU28 
(United Nations Conference on Trade and Development)  
 
 
 
 
Country 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012
Luxembourg 84,701 126,027 158,864 132,312 171,589 273,874 245,322 319,968 308,586 343,854 232,385
Belgium 22,383 34,116 45,047 36,312 45,953 76,949 80,503 90,761 88,955 92,354 93,714
Ireland 46,470 55,563 50,823 39,329 37,027 47,465 43,257 56,685 63,889 55,609 65,092
Sweden 13,384 17,793 22,017 19,038 24,990 32,085 30,184 35,672 37,012 36,448 39,617
Malta 5,845 8,167 9,974 10,507 15,896 19,755 18,750 21,271 38,965 37,462 37,716
Netherlands 21,810 28,395 32,017 29,402 33,750 46,621 39,120 38,906 35,234 35,130 34,281
Denmark 15,417 18,607 21,594 21,486 24,581 29,736 28,101 28,384 25,919 25,982 26,404
Cyprus 6,783 9,374 11,532 11,191 17,841 23,165 21,023 23,020 21,600 25,690 26,016
United Kingdom 9,216 10,606 12,315 14,082 18,650 20,118 15,653 17,841 18,671 18,906 20,962
Austria 5,554 7,086 8,639 10,028 13,426 19,550 17,758 20,626 19,201 18,042 18,758
France 7,164 10,532 13,891 14,139 17,500 19,594 14,127 16,131 16,273 14,683 16,723
Finland 6,539 9,645 10,979 10,450 13,401 17,334 15,713 15,944 16,161 16,503 16,657
EU27 (European Union) 6,149 8,135 9,926 9,673 12,136 15,188 13,374 14,847 14,824 14,604 15,453
Estonia 3,119 5,188 7,449 8,380 9,450 12,482 12,209 12,531 12,449 12,478 14,052
Spain 6,216 8,079 9,536 8,861 10,485 13,135 13,044 13,853 13,637 13,391 13,567
Czech Republic 3,788 4,440 5,613 5,935 7,783 10,899 10,906 12,053 12,247 11,445 12,914
Portugal 4,282 5,789 6,374 6,007 8,363 10,870 9,400 10,764 10,462 10,461 10,950
Hungary 3,566 4,770 6,089 6,058 7,964 9,506 8,781 9,878 9,079 8,475 10,408
Slovakia 2,300 4,025 5,209 5,465 7,113 8,785 9,265 9,636 9,206 9,375 10,185
Germany 3,613 4,783 6,205 5,767 7,166 8,429 8,096 8,509 8,708 8,639 8,737
Slovenia 2,065 3,163 3,799 3,626 4,478 7,144 7,748 7,502 7,128 7,424 7,611
Croatia 1,360 1,930 2,790 3,275 6,173 10,180 6,992 8,299 7,944 7,022 7,205
Bulgaria 516 813 1,298 1,790 3,054 4,965 5,804 6,526 6,302 6,354 6,741
Poland 1,264 1,515 2,273 2,381 3,295 4,672 4,299 4,842 5,634 5,175 6,018
Latvia 1,171 1,404 1,953 2,138 3,260 4,752 5,080 5,131 4,774 5,391 5,931
Italy 2,343 3,252 3,978 4,048 5,289 6,328 5,475 6,049 5,418 5,581 5,854
Lithuania 1,150 1,439 1,862 2,404 3,236 4,457 3,854 3,956 3,993 4,313 4,798
Romania 356 557 938 1,186 2,094 2,909 3,146 3,343 3,270 3,328 3,468
Greece 1,405 2,021 2,555 2,610 3,680 4,728 3,376 3,717 3,083 2,561 3,310
